





Jon Karl Nickell 
NCKJON001 
MPhil Human Rights Law 
Title: Reclaiming State Power to Bridge Governance Gaps in Global Trade 
Supervisor: Dr. Shane Godfrey, University of Cape Town 
17 February 2014 




Research dissertation/ research paper presented for the approval of Senate in fulfillment 
of part of the requirements for the MPhil in approved courses and a minor dissertation/ 
research paper. The other part of the requirement for this qualification was the 
completion of a programme of courses.  
I hereby declare that I have read and understood the regulations governing the 
submission of MPhil dissertations/ research papers, including those relating to length 
and plagiarism, as contained in the rules of this University, and that this dissertation/ 




























The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 















TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………… 5 
CHAPTER 1 
 I. Introduction…………………………………………………………….. 8 
 II. Economic upgrading, social downgrading? ………………………….. 9 
 III. The shortcomings of corporate codes………………………………… 17 
 IV. Struggling against consciously created zones of impunity…………… 21 
 V. The persistent power of states…………………………………………. 27 
CHAPTER 2 
 I. Apparel in the developing world……………………………………….. 29  
 II. How we got here: Apparel and the history of the quota regime………. 30 
 III. Defining economic and social upgrading, by the numbers…………… 36 
 IV. Sen and social upgrading…………………………………………….. 38 
 V. Economic upgrading in the apparel industry………………………….. 41 
 VI. Social upgrading in the apparel industry……………………………… 46 
 VII. A link between economic and social upgrading?................................ 48 
 VIII. Why Asia wins and Central America loses………………………… 51 
CHAPTER 3 
 I. Uneven free trade………………………………………………………. 52 
 II. Apparel trade in the Americas………………………………………… 55 
 III. The question of Asian dominance……………………………………. 57 
 IV. Learning from Nicaragua…………………………………………….. 59 
 V. Where do we go from here? ………………………………………….. 64 
CHAPTER 4 
 I. Introduction……………………………………………………………. 67 
 II. Guiding Principles and the Corporate Responsibility to Respect  
 Human Rights……………………………………………………………. 70 
 III. The State Duty to Protect…………………………………………….. 72 
 IV. Access to Remedy……………………………………………………. 78 






GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AGOA  African Growth and Opportunity Act 
ATC   Agreement on Textiles and Clothing  
BRICS  Brasil, Russia, India, China, South Africa  
CAFTA-DR  Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
CAT   Convention Against Torture  
CBI   Caribbean Basin Initiative  
CEDAW  Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination Against Women  
CESCR  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
CMT  Cut, make, trim 
CRC   Convention on the Rights of the Child  
CSR   Corporate social responsibility 
EPA   Economic partnership agreement 
EPZ  Export processing zone  
EU   European Union  
FTA   Free trade agreement  
GATT  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade  
GDP   Gross domestic product  
GPN   Global production network  
GVC   Global value chain  
HOPE   Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership for Encouragement Act 
HRC   Human Rights Council  
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
ICERD  International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
  Discrimination  
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights  
ICRMW  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
  Workers  
ILO   International Labour Organization  





MFA   Multi-fibre Arrangement  
NAFTA  North America Free Trade Agreement 
OEM   Original equipment manufacturing  
OPSC   Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child  
OPT   Outward processing trade  
RoO   Rules of origin  
RTA   Regional trade agreement  
SEZ   Special economic zone  
TPL   Tariff preference level  
TRIPS  Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  
UDHR  Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
UN   United Nations  
US   United States  






















INTRODUCTION: RECLAIMING STATE POWER TO BRIDGE 
GOVERNANCE GAPS IN GLOBAL TRADE 
An astute understanding of history is not required to grasp that global trade is not a new 
phenomenon. As a very young student in American schools, I still recall learning about 
the caravans of traders trekking across the Silk Road, about the merchant traveller 
Marco Polo, about the misplaced aspirations of Christopher Columbus and the resulting 
Columbian Exchange between Europe and the Americas. 
 This is an oft-mythologized and sometimes flatly fabricated period of history,
1
 
but there are basic truths at the base of it all. There were certainly men embarking on 
difficult journeys across vast ocean stretches, carrying goods from one continent to 
another with the hope of striking it rich (or at least making enough to buy themselves a 
good time at the next harbour). There were certainly people who profited, and plenty 
more who were exploited.    
 But while global trade is not new, the structure and volume of global trade has 
changed drastically during recent decades. More money is at stake, and so is a greater 
swath of humanity. Complex global value chains
2
 have sprouted, in which a single 
product may contain fingerprints from dozens of countries when it finally lands on retail 
shelves. 
 In this dissertation I am concerned with the fate of workers that toil 
anonymously at the base of these global value chains. But my primary focus is to 
contest a myth, though it has nothing to do with Christopher Columbus. Rather, the 
dominant narrative surrounding contemporary global trade suggests that regulation of 
such is beyond our reach. Due to the evolving structure of global trade, ‘governance 
gaps’ have emerged. 
 This begs many questions: Who is responsible for achieving a remedy when 
things go wrong, when a factory collapse kills hundreds of workers or when the makers 
of high-priced fashion aren’t paid a living wage? Do we turn to the state that shelters the 
corporation, even if the wrongdoing occurs outside their jurisdiction? What about the 
state where the operations are based? Can they impose their will on corporations that 
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are sheltered elsewhere? Are the corporations themselves responsible, even when they 
are not directly involved in outsourced operations? Are local manufacturers at fault if 
they are acting at the behest of a more powerful entity? 
 The consensus arising from these vexing questions is that states are no longer 
equipped to regulate trade in a fully globalised world dominated by transnational 
corporations, thus many have sought remedies in private forms of governance. This 
dissertation seeks to dispute this common narrative and suggest that, not only have 
states retained enormous power in global trade, they also remain the most capable entity 
to regulate it. Democratic regimes persist as our best chance to protect the livelihoods of 
workers.    
 This could potentially be construed as a naïve or simplistic argument. 
Governments in developing economies are unlikely to act in the interest of its citizens, 
especially those poor enough to endure sweatshop labour conditions. On the other hand, 
governments in developed economies, where transnational corporations are based, are 
unlikely to hold those corporations accountable, especially when the bulk of corporate 
activity occurs abroad. Of course, these are legitimate realities.  
 However, this dissertation presents two overarching arguments in response. 
First, I propose that a distinction must be made between a government being ‘unwilling’ 
to act and a government being ‘unable’ to act. The commonly accepted vexation in 
global trade is that governance gaps have emerged, which suggests that states are 
‘unable’ to regulate global trade. I devote many pages to constructing an argument for 
just how powerful states remain. The goal is to reveal that states are ‘unwilling’ rather 
than ‘unable’ to regulate trade and protect workers, thus shifting the conversation 
entirely. If we accept the argument that states are ‘unable,’ we have conceded a very 
powerful platform to struggle for improvement. We must reclaim that platform. 
 Secondly, as I build the argument for the power retained by states, I aim to 
reveal why this provides a better platform on which to struggle for worker’s rights. 
Much of this is rooted in Nancy Fraser’s theoretical conception of justice, which she 
defines as “parity of participation.”
3
 But there are also signs that developing economies 
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like Nicaragua, emerging economies like China, and developed economies in the EU 
have begun to harness this power with promising results.  
 In chapter one, I explore the nuances of global value chains and the various 
attempts to redress the human rights violations occurring throughout. I lay the 
foundation for why public institutions should be the focus of attempts to struggle for 
improvements in worker’s livelihoods.   
 In chapters two and three, I focus almost exclusively on apparel value chains
4
 in 
order to explore the great extent to which state policies, often created by economic 
powerhouses, affect the types of work created in the industry. Of course, the rights that 
workers enjoy are strongly linked to the types of jobs that they are able to secure. In 
chapter two, I utilise macro statistical data in order to explore how trade arrangements 
and other forms of public trade regulation have differentiated impacts on various 
regions and individual countries. In chapter three I continue to explore the impact of 
trade regimes to grapple with questions of why a certain region – and even a specific 
country within a region – fares far better than others around it. Again, the aim is to build 
the argument for just how much power states retain over global trade regulation. 
 In the fourth and final chapter, I turn to an interesting development within our 
most visible of human rights institutions – the United Nations. Largely due to the efforts 
of John Ruggie, the UN has shifted its rhetoric on human rights violations by 
transnational corporations. The UN once attempted to impose on corporations the same 
human rights obligations as states under international law. But a shift has occurred, in 
which the UN clearly prioritises the state duty to protect against corporate abuses. I 
applaud the shift toward state accountability, but I closely consider the merits and 
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The structure and volume of global trade has changed dramatically over the past three 
decades, with highly variable consequences for the actors and institutions involved. 
This chapter will highlight governance challenges created by these new structures. My 
primary concern here, however, is the workers that toil anonymously in the basement of 
global value chains. It is by now well known that global value chains are not always 
benevolent to these workers – last year’s factory collapse in Bangladesh offered a 
dramatic reminder of this.
5
 How do we respond to this pressing problem? I argue that, 
using Nancy Fraser’s conception of justice as ‘parity of participation,’
6
 a radical shift is 
imperative in the struggle for justice within global value chains.  
 Global value chain (GVC) analysis offers a top-down understanding of the 
development of these chains, positing that ‘lead firms’ are the core actors and exert high 
levels of control over complex and fragmented global chains. I utilise GVC analysis to 
explore the increasing complexity of global value chains and the development of 
various types of public and private governance within these chains. My purpose in 
exploring governance is to arrive at an understanding of the challenges of ‘social 
upgrading,’ or effects on the welfare of workers, within value chains. 
 The most prominent response to the injustices of global value chains has been 
the development of voluntary corporate governance mechanisms that are often 
monitored by independent NGOs. In this model, companies are responding to pressures 
from consumers. I will explore how these attempts have largely fallen short of their 
aims, but I will also argue that they are missing the point entirely. Viewing justice as 
‘parity of participation’ demands that workers become central actors in the struggle for 
their own livelihoods. 
 Ultimately I propose that efforts to bring justice to global value chains should 
return their focus to public institutions. The emphasis on private governance emerged 
because of perceived governance ‘gaps’ among state power. Because of the 
fragmentation involved in long strands of transnational business transactions, states are 
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no longer able to regulate corporate activity – or so the argument goes. I contest the 
dominant narrative of governance ‘gaps’ as the core problem and argue that these ‘gaps’ 
are actually what I call ‘consciously created zones of impunity.’  
 States have participated in rendering themselves unable to regulate corporate 
activity, and therefore have the ability to reverse this trend, or at least mitigate the 
negative impacts on workers. I also contest recent arguments that lead firms in global 
value chains lack the power to regulate their chains, but I conclude that public 
institutions provide a better platform for the struggle for workers’ rights. 
 
II. ECONOMIC UPGRADING, SOCIAL DOWNGRADING?  
Although globalisation is often considered a recent development linked to enhanced 
communication technologies and cheaper forms of transportation, global trade is not a 
new phenomenon. Yet the structure of global trade has transformed dramatically during 
recent decades. US companies began outsourcing manufacturing jobs in the mid-1960s, 
and retailers joined them in the 1970s and 1980s, searching for cheaper producers of 
consumer goods.
7
 In addition to transportation and communication improvements, trade 
liberalisation policies promoted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) further 
incentivised this process.
8
 This led to a shift from what Gereffi calls ‘producer-driven’ 
value chains to ‘buyer-driven’ value chains.
9
  
 Whereas power was held by end-product manufacturers in ‘producer-driven’ 
chains, ‘buyer-driven’ chains are characterised by retailers and marketers that are able 
to influence consumers with strong brand names but depend on external manufacturers 
to produce their goods. ‘One of the key insights that emerges from GVC analysis is the 
growing importance of global buyers as key drivers in the formation of internationally 
dispersed production and trade networks.’
10
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 These strong brands, such as Liz Claiborne and Nike, became ‘manufacturers 
without factories.’
11
 Initially, there were strong ties between ‘lead firms’ and their 
suppliers, as described by one of the founders of Liz Claiborne, one of the first 
companies to develop manufacturing ties with East Asia:  
 ‘Thus, we had to train and develop them by supplying technical help, trim, findings, 
 and virtually all components. While we counted on them for their labor, we had to tell 
 them exactly how to use the basic skills of their people and we had to watch them very 
 carefully, every step of the way.’
12
 
 What soon emerged, however, was that these same manufacturers began 
outsourcing the labour themselves, receiving orders from lead firms and contracting the 
work to low-wage countries like Indonesia and Vietnam. Eventually, sub-contractors in 
those countries passed on the work to someone else. The result of this ‘triangle 
manufacturing’
13
 was that lead firms no longer exercised direct control over the 
production of consumer goods and dealt instead with middle men. Supply chains soon 
grew exponentially more complex. ‘In essence, marketers now recognize that overseas 
contractors have the capability to manage all aspects of the production process, which 
restricts the competitive edge of marketers to design and brands.’
14
 
 However, GVC analysis argues that lead firms still retain control over global 
supply chains, or governance, with mechanisms such as quality control.
15
 ‘Governance 
is the centrepiece of GVC analysis. It shows how corporate power can actively shape 
the distribution of profits and risk in an industry, and the actors who exercise such 
power through their activities.’
16
  
 Governance structures vary across three dimensions.
17
 First is the distinction 
between public and private governance. Public governance is imposed by the state, 
while private governance consists of various factors, such as societal norms and 
collective bargaining agreements that affect how market actors manoeuvre. The 
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emergence of corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an example of private 
governance.  
 Secondly, the function of governance can be to facilitate, regulate, or 
redistribute. Facilitative governance spurs economic activity by aiding the creation of 
markets and jobs and attracting investment. Regulatory governance seeks to prevent 
corporate abuse and the exploitation of workers by protecting job security, working 
conditions, and freedom of association. Finally, redistributive governance attempts to 
remedy inequalities via taxation, social services, and a minimum wage. 
 Thirdly, the scale of governance can be local, national, or international, and it 
can be specific to an industry or more broadly applicable. Public governance tends to be 
local or national and is not industry specific, while private governance is more flexible 
in crossing national boundaries and can be fitted for a specific industry or even a 
specific firm. This final distinction is the reason why many turned to forms of private 
governance to remedy corporate abuses in global value chains.  
 What are the effects of governance? This is the question addressed by 
considerations of ‘economic upgrading.’ While governance is the top-down centrepiece 
of global value chains, ‘economic upgrading’ considers the bottom-up perspective, or 
the various ways in which developing countries and local actors manoeuvre to enhance 
their position in the global economy.
18
  
 Four main types of economic upgrading have been identified:
19
 process 
upgrading involves making production more efficient; product upgrading involves the 
introduction of advanced products that require more skilled employees; functional 
upgrading involves a change in activities to increase value added tasks, such as 
specialization or vertical integration; and chain upgrading involves moving into new 
industries that demand more technologically advanced production chains.
20
 With each 
of these four types of economic upgrading, there is both a capital dimension – new 
technologies – and a labour dimension – skill development. 
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 To deal with the complex intersection between governance and economic 
upgrading, and in response to criticisms that his conception of buyer-driven chains was 
overly simplistic,
21
 Gereffi developed five different types of value chain governance: 
markets, modular value chains, relational value chains, captive value chains, and 
hierarchy.
22
 The type of governance used in a particular chain is based on three factors: 
the complexity of information required for a transaction, whether the information can be 
efficiently codified, and the capabilities of suppliers.  
 In the following chapter of this dissertation, I will explore the strong degree to 
which trade agreements affect these decisions. For now, it is not necessary to discuss 
these variations in detail, but it is important to acknowledge the complexity, variability, 
and evolving nature of global supply chains if we are going to consider the rights of 
workers within these chains. For example, the apparel industry evolved from what was 
initially a captive chain (small suppliers dependent on big buyers) to a relational value 
chain (complex interactions based on mutual dependence) in East Asia. Also, produce 
trade between Kenya and the United Kingdom changed from market coordination 
(simple transactions in which producers need little guidance from buyers) to a more 
captive chain as supermarkets become more concerned with the quality of produce.
23
  
 Thus, many middlemen in East Asia have been able to position themselves 
favourably and capture the benefits of economic upgrading, while produce growers in 
Kenya have been less successful. All across these various types of chains, however, the 
impacts on workers are less clear-cut. In short, economic upgrading does not 
automatically lead to ‘social upgrading.’ Barrientos has brought this to light by 
assessing the effects of global value chains on ‘social upgrading,’ or the ability of 
labourers within global value chains to access decent work. (Barrientos uses the ILO 
definition of decent work, which allows ‘conditions of freedom, equity, security and 
dignity, in which rights are protected and adequate remuneration and social coverage is 
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) Barrientos actually utilises analysis of global production networks (GPN) 
rather than GVCs in order to shift attention to the well being of workers, because GPN 
analysis incorporates the role of workers – something that GVC analysis neglects.
25
  
 While GVC analysis focuses on value creation and capture in the production and 
distribution processes, GPN analysis drew attention to the social context of inter-
connected business operations, investigating not just the interaction between lead firms 
and suppliers but all of the actors involved in shaping global production. This includes 
national governments, international trade unions, and NGOs, and also places an 
emphasis on power relations between actors. 
 There have been some case studies that have assessed employment conditions 
and rights of workers in GPNs. ‘However, there has been a disjuncture in the literature 
between a ‘firm focus’ that treats labour as a factor of production, and a “rights focus” 
that examines conditions and entitlements of workers.’
26
 
 In order to address the fracture between economic and social analyses of labour, 
Barrientos attempts to ‘integrate workers as productive and social agents into the 
changing dynamics of GPNs in developing countries.’
27
 The goal is to increase 
understanding for how economic and social upgrading play out differently for firms and 




 The first is labour as a productive factor. An assumption of conventional 
economic theory is that firms should operate at the lowest possible cost to maximize 
competitiveness, but this fails to consider the complex role of labour within GVCs and 
GPNs. In order to meet both cost and quality pressures, the intensity and skill level of 
labour must be considered and is affected by local labour market conditions and the 
requirements of buyers. 
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 The second is workers as social agents. Workers are largely dependent on access 
to rights to enhance their own well being – the right to organize, for example – and their 
ability to access rights is dependent on their position and involvement in GPNs. This 
view considers both the capabilities and entitlements of workers.  
 There are challenges of considering work within a GPN context. Employment is 
affected by both national labour protections and the demands of buyers in terms of 
quality, price, and production schedule. Also, the labour codes of large buyers, often 
monitored by private groups, impacts the quality of employment in addition to national 
labour protections. 
 Despite all this, the core component of GVC analysis remains: the type of 
governance exercised by buyers is the primary factor affecting the workings of value 
chains and the fate of workers. ‘The employment decisions of domestic suppliers are 




 Thus, when concerns came to light regarding sweatshops and other poor 
working conditions created by global value chains, the problem was understood as a 
tension between corporate governance and social upgrading.
30
 Traditionally, this 
problem – corporate activity versus workers’ welfare – would have been resolved by 
states implementing regulatory measures or redistributive mechanisms such as labour 
laws. But the game has changed. When corporate activities reach across state 
boundaries, and those corporations do not in fact employ the workers being harmed, 
who is responsible for addressing the problem? Here, we arrive at the logic of 
governance ‘gaps’ or ‘deficits.’  
 Governance structures were initially created as a response to the rise of modern 
industrial economies, and states initially shared a basic commitment to labour 
regulations and social protections, despite a lack of international regulatory 
mechanisms. This allowed for stable international trade. But globalisation disrupted this 
stability. Trade liberalisation and the opening of economies in Asia and Eastern Europe 
expanded the market to include countries with far lower wages and meagre governance 
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structures. The global value chains that emerged across these countries presented 




 The majority of production suddenly occurred in countries where regulatory and 
redistributive mechanisms were weak or absent, and many countries eroded some 
protections already in place in order to become more attractive investment destinations, 
such as the special economic zones (SEZs) established in countries like China, Vietnam, 
and Cambodia (much like maquiladoras in Latin America).
32
 
 International trade organizations focused on facilitation, especially the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and WTO, but also the World Bank and World 
Intellectual Property Organization.
33
 Beginning in the 1970s these institutions expanded 
market access while staving off attempts by trade unions to embed agreements with 
labour protections.
34
 Organizations like the ILO were significantly disadvantaged 
during the shift from national industrial relations structures to global neoliberal trade 
agreements, according to some.
35
 
 Overall, the Bretton Woods institutions have shown little interest in promoting 
social upgrading and have continued to focus their efforts on facilitation rather than 
regulation or redistribution. The WTO, for example, has repeatedly refused to consider 
human rights as part of its core mission.
36
 World Bank policy has shifted, however, 
making adherence to International Labour Organization (ILO) standards mandatory to 
receive funding for infrastructure projects. Yet, in Doing Business, the World Bank 
benchmarking program, labour standards like work hours, minimum wage, and 
protection from discrimination are described as obstacles to ‘doing business’.
37
  
 Regional institutions have shown greater promise for reform – especially the EU 
– and the American Development Bank and Asian Development Bank have 
demonstrated stronger commitment than the World Bank.
38
 Additionally, embedding 
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labour requirements in free trade agreements is becoming more prevalent, with the EU 
again demonstrating the greatest commitment. The North America Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement 
(CAFTA-DR) include side agreements on labour, but provisions are weak and don’t 
include references to core pillars of ILO.
39
 Lastly, the G20 has emerged, consisting of 
emerging economies, and this presents the possibility of pushing for reform of Bretton 
Woods institutions. Thus, innovations have occurred in linking labour practices to trade 
agreements, in implanting labour standards into Bretton Woods institutions, and 
constructing new power blocs in the South. 
 Still, many argue that traditional state regulation and newer public governance 
mechanisms no longer retain the capacity to regulate transnational corporate activity. 
‘Global production systems… have weakened the ability of national government to 
effectively regulate labour markets and ensure decent work in those sectors given their 
lack of control of corporate buyers who operate outside their borders.’
40
 The home 
countries of multinational corporations cannot regulate employment in jurisdictions 
across the world. Similarly, developing countries, where manufacturing activities are 
based, do not have control over corporate buyers that are based in the Global North (this 
paradigm has experienced some transformation lately as domestic markets emerge in 
the Global South). Likewise, international institutions like the ILO do not have the 
scope to enforce labour standards. As a result, NGOs emerged to fill the perceived 
deficits created by the newborn vexations of global production.  
 Have these efforts been successful? The answer to this question must be 
considered carefully. In the next section I propose that, while NGOs managed to 
enhance employment conditions for some workers, their efforts have largely fallen short 
because they fail to address the radical injustices described by Fraser as ‘parity of 
participation.’ Using Fraser’s conception of justice, I contest the dominant narrative of 
governance gaps presented above.  
 
 









III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF CORPORATE CODES 
When states failed to regulate employment in global value chains, civil society 
organizations argued that global buyers harness asymmetrical power within global value 
chains and are therefore themselves responsible for regulating their social effects. 
NGOs effectively used ‘name and shame’ tactics by mobilising awareness about the ill 
effects of global chains, thus threatening the brand image of powerful buyers.
41
 This has 
led to the most prominent response to poor employment conditions caused by global 
value chains, the ‘mushrooming’ of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and labour 
codes,
42
 which are often monitored by independent groups. Private governance 
responses include voluntary attempts by firms to implement CSR across their supply 
chains, consumer calls for ethical sourcing, and investor movements to create socially 
responsible markets. 
 When utilising GVC analysis, this response is not illogical. Powerful buyers 
respond to pressures from shareholders and consumer expectations for quality goods at 
low prices; these pressures are then pushed down the supply chain and ultimately lead 
to the exploitation of workers.
43
 Corporations, therefore, harness the power to ensure 
that labour standards are met by manipulating governance mechanisms. However, these 
labour codes do not always have the desired effect. Barrientos has demonstrated that 
South African fruit growers have responded in multiple ways to simultaneous and often 
contradictory pressures from buyers for higher quality, lower cost produce that is 
pushed to market with more stringent employment standards. The result is that some 
workers benefit from better pay and working conditions, but there is also a ‘noted 
increase in the use of contract labour,’ meaning that many more workers go unprotected 
by any standards whatsoever.
44
  
 This paradigm is seen across various types of chains and especially hurts 
vulnerable groups like migrants and women.  
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 ‘Men… are more likely to hold permanent jobs with higher wages. In contrast, women 
 are concentrated in the “twilight” zone between the two forms of work, increasingly 
 engaged in “informal” types of employment, moving “flexibly” between the productive 
 and reproductive economy as required by dictates of work.’
45
  
Indeed, 75 per cent of women in Chile’s agriculture sector are on temporary contracts, 
less than half of women in Bangladesh’s garment sector have a contract, and women on 




 It must be noted that some progress has been achieved due to implementation of 
corporate codes, most evidently in health and safety, which include ‘clearer procedures, 
information and training, fire safety, personal protective equipment, safer use of 
chemicals, lighting and ventilation, toilets and drinking water.’
47
 Also, codes have led to 
a reduction of working hours and an increase in wages for some workers (although 
wage increases were not significant enough to guarantee a living wage). Such benefits 
should not be belittled; any improvements in the lives of workers must be lauded. But to 
what extent have these improvements actually made a difference? Both industry and 
anti-sweatshop organizations have begun to question the ability of private monitoring 




 After spending years researching Nike’s attempts at corporate responsibility, 
Locke arrived at a similar conclusion: 
 ‘But have these private efforts improved labor standards? Not by much. Despite many 
 good faith efforts over the past fifteen years, private regulation has had limited impact. 
 Child labor, hazardous working conditions, excessive hours, and poor wages continue 
 to plague many workplaces in the developing world, creating scandal and 
 embarrassment for the global companies that source from these factories and farms.’
49
 
 Even further, any improvements that have been realized fall under what 
Barrientos calls ‘outcome standards,’ or specific conditions of work such as health and 
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safety, while no gains have been achieved in ‘process rights,’ or the ability of workers 
to negotiate on their own behalf via freedom of association and the right to collective 
bargaining. Here, we arrive at what I posit is the primary problem. 
 NGOs that have resorted to pressuring corporations to fill the governance gaps 
created by global supply chains must participate in the model created by corporations 
themselves. This is problematic for multiple reasons. First, external monitoring 
companies depend on corporations, or suppliers themselves, to fund their activities. This 
is not inherently problematic, except that:  
 ‘Even well-intentioned monitors may recognize that an overly zealous inspection may 
 prompt  companies to look for a different monitor in the future, and when that fear is 




 Secondly, Barrientos has pointed out that there is a tension between commercial 
aims and achieving justice for workers.
51
 Suppliers often have difficulty implementing 
codes put forth by buyers due to pressures placed on them by the buyers themselves, 
which include ‘downward movement in prices, shorter lead times between order and 
delivery, increasingly stringent demands on product specification (often at the expense 
of suppliers), and insecurity of orders.’
52
  
 Thirdly, when lead firms fail to deliver improvements with corporate codes, this 
leaves open the possibility for corporations to argue that their own governance power is 
limited to affect change (private governance gaps), as reflected by a Nike representative 
in response to Locke’s criticisms of the company’s efforts: ‘The gains we’ve made are 
fragile, especially considering that these supply chains were not built to cope with the 
volatility and pace of change we now see across the world.’
53
 Certainly, ‘volatility and 
pace of change’ are real concerns, and it is easy to recognize the difficulty with 
monitoring the kinds of ‘triangle manufacturing’ supply chains that emerged in East 
Asia and are now prevalent around the world. But it is also essential to recognize that 
these conditions are not inevitable. Corporations create and participate in these types of 
                                                          
50
 Gay Seidman, ‘Regulation at Work: Globalization, Labor Rights, and Development,’ Social Research 
79:4 (2012), 1029. 
51
 Barrientos, ‘Global Production Systems and Decent Work,’ 11. 
52
 Barrientos, ‘Assessing Codes of Labour Practice,’ 725. 
53





supply chains because it is economically advantageous (as seen with examples given 
above of companies changing types of governance, from captive to relational value 
chains, etc., to maximize profits). They often undermine their own codes with the 
pressures described by Barrientos above, in addition to switching producers frequently 
and sourcing via middle men rather than directly controlling manufacturing, which 




 Indeed, Gereffi argues that large retailers and major brands are ‘dictating the 
way the chains are operating,’
55
 and Arthurs proposes that their employment decisions 
involve a ‘rational calculus: will adhering to decent and more costly labour standards 
yield a net advantage over the opposite strategy?’
56
 And because corporations have 
become such dominant institutions on the global stage (the 100 largest global firms 
exceed the GDP of many countries
57
), they can conceivably be viewed as regulatory 
agents themselves.
58
 For example, they mobilise favourable research and interest groups 
to shape public opinion and affect state policies when they threaten to invest elsewhere 
or move to jurisdictions with fewer regulatory obstacles.  
 In short, Barrientos concludes that improvements in employment via corporate 
codes are unlikely to be prioritised and achieved unless it becomes profitable.
59
 And if it 
is truly a matter of incentives, then of course gaps are not the real obstacle.  
 Fourthly and finally, NGOs working to monitor corporate codes as a method to 
address employment problems is problematic because these codes are not built to help 
workers achieve process rights. ‘Codes constitute outcome standards passed down from 
buyers or are viewed as part of the prerogative of management which, often from a 
paternalist perspective, “knows” what is in the best interests of its workers.’
60
 Yet 
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achieving process rights for workers is exactly what Nancy Fraser’s theory of global 
social justice demands. 
 Enforcement of private labour codes is likely unsustainable because it depends 
on consistent pressure from consumers and NGOs, but more importantly the struggle 
for justice according to Fraser means ensuring that workers have the ability to, well, 
struggle. For Fraser, justice requires ‘parity of participation.’
61
 In general, this radical-
democratic conception of justice requires social structures that enable all persons to 
participate in social life as peers. This is considered in three dimensions: economic, 
cultural, and political. The economic dimension pertains to distributive justice and 
addresses the economic structures that can deny persons the ability to interact with 
others on an equal playing field. The cultural dimension addresses status inequality, or 
the denial of recognition by established hierarchies of cultural value. The first 
dimension involves the class structure and the second case involves the status order.   
 The third dimension is political, which is my primary focus here. The political 
dimension of justice ‘furnishes the stage on which struggles over distribution and 
recognition are played out.’
62
 In the following section I will discuss why Fraser’s theory 
provides a particularly powerful analysis of attempts to improve working conditions in 
global value chains. 
 
IV. STRUGGLING AGAINST CONCIOUSLY CREATED ZONES OF IMPUNITY 
Movements that exclude the voices and leadership of workers are unlikely to achieve 
significant gains. As described above, voluntary corporate regulation has not yielded the 
desired results, partly because justice for workers is placed in the hands of consumers, 
civil society organizations, and corporations. It would be incorrect to claim that none of 
these entities is capable of enhancing the lives of workers. On the contrary, I have 
argued the exact opposite, and indeed, gains have been achieved – though limited. But 
sought after transformation has thus far proved elusive, and history instructs us that 
radical change is unlikely to occur if those with the most at stake are not mobilised (i.e. 
workers themselves). ‘The right to organize is the worker's most effective weapon 
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 Still, according to Fraser, even if significant improvements were achieved via 
corporate codes, bringing higher wages and better working conditions, global value 
chains would still be rife with injustice. Of Fraser’s three dimensions of justice, this 
improvement would only impact the first dimension, that of economic distribution 
(although exponential wage increases would be necessary to be considered real 
economic redistribution). Of the second dimension, gains realized without the input of 
workers would likely reinforce the dearth of cultural parity because of the top-down, 
paternalistic nature of such an approach. Of the third dimension, current efforts seem to 
actually undermine the political participation of workers by measuring progress 
according to standards set by corporations. Thus, justice as ‘parity of participation’ in 
all of Fraser’s dimensions demands that a radical reconceptualisation of tactics used to 
struggle for workers is necessary. 
 I should reiterate that I do not mean to discount the small improvements 
achieved in employment conditions around the world, and I certainly do not intend to 
suggest the utilisation of an idealistic theory that is unlikely to function in the real 
world. Quite the opposite, it seems that the failures of the most robust response thus far 
to injustice in global supply chains has indicated that a radical shift is imperative, that 
workers must be enabled to participate in the struggle, and participate as equals to 
others that struggle on their behalf. Fraser argues that justice is not achieved without 
enabling the political participation of workers, but the analysis thus far suggests that 
other dimensions of justice cannot be achieved without parity of political participation 
in the first place.  
 What does political participation entail? Primarily, it requires a democratic 
structure accessible to workers. That democratic structure can be private or public, of 
which there are two potentialities each: home governments to corporations; local 
governments in developing countries; lead firms in the global North; and local suppliers 
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in developing countries. Of course, here we are faced with the obstacles created by 
evolving structures of global trade. Each institution requires a closer look.  
 We have already established that political access to private structures is limited. 
Labour occurs in factories or fields that are owned by local entities, not formally 
connected to lead firms. Even if labourers were allowed to organize against the 
conditions set by local managers, it would achieve little because employment conditions 
are created by lead firms. Thus, workers would need access to lead firms, but the chasm 
between a factory worker in Bangladesh and a brand manager in the United States is 
vast. Not only is there an absence of a communication method, there is no incentive for 
the brand manager to take heed of the worker’s concerns. NGOs have attempted to 
remedy this by mobilising consumers and pressuring brands, and monitoring their 
efforts, to little effect. Workers do not have a platform to struggle against lead firms, 
and thus far NGOs have attempted to reform from within, which keeps workers on the 
outside looking in. There does remain some potential for NGOs to bridge the chasm 
between workers and lead firms by pressuring corporations to grant process rights. 
 Otherwise, public institutions provide the other path to struggle. Public 
institutions in general are more likely to respond to the voices of workers – and 
consumers for that matter. This is not because government leaders are more benevolent 
than corporate leaders, but rather because states hold the highest responsibility to 
citizens, while corporations are responsible to shareholders. Thus, corporations respond 
partly to consumer pressure because it potentially threatens the value of their company, 
but their ultimate loyalties lie elsewhere. I am not naïve in believing that states are not 
also influenced by corporate pressures (which I will explore below), but at the very least 
public platforms are a more level ground for struggle.  
 Might it be more productive for consumers to pressure their states, rather than 
their brand corporations, to address injustices created by lead firms in global supply 
chains? Obviously, workers in developing countries cannot do this. They do not have 
citizen power to pressure the home states of corporations, but they do retain that power 
within their own countries. Should justice movements concentrate on these states? 





swift panacea, but I am suggesting that concentrating efforts in these arenas may create 
better opportunities to struggle for real justice. 
 However, we must first consider a large obstacle, which is: do states retain the 
capacity to regulate these types of transnational activities in the first place? A common 
assumption is that national governments are limited in the global economy,
64
 thus the 
common narrative of public governance ‘gaps,’ or ‘deficits.’ But are public institutions 
really that powerless? I suggest that states – both home states to corporations and states 
where production occurs – have actually participated in the creation of the structures 
that allow corporations to control global supply chains with impunity. Therefore, these 
governance ‘gaps’ are not incidental effects of happenstance changes in trade, but are 
more aptly described as ‘consciously created zones of impunity.’ This is why Mayer 
and Pickles note,  
 ‘[The] efficacy of state-level governance has been partially eroded by neo-liberal 
 commitments to deregulation and market-based mechanisms and by globalization, 
 particularly as production moves to low-cost producing locations in the global South 
 with less-well-developed facilitative, regulatory, and compensatory capacities.’
65
 
 Powerful countries like the United States have promoted neo-liberal policies by 
eroding such redistributive mechanisms as labour law via foreign policy, trade 
legislation and treaties, and by exercising power in international economic institutions 
like the World Bank, IMF, and WTO.
66
 In the 1980s and 1990s, loan conditionality 
from the IMF and World Bank required that states make labour laws more ‘flexible’ by 
increasing temporary contracts, reducing social security, extending overtime, and 
cutting minimum wages.
67
 And if the US was able to influence labour deregulation 
through the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, then there is also the possibility to reverse 
those policies. More directly, as will be discussed in much greater detail in the 
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following chapters, countries like the US harness the power to implement specific 
changes in trade policy via regional trade agreements such as NAFTA and CAFTA-DR. 
 Also, the U.S. has enacted ‘business friendly’ policies that shelter corporate 
managers from the damaging effects of their business decisions.
68
 Such a ‘business 
judgment rule’ shields managers from potential environmental and human rights 
violations around the world.
69
 For the purpose of this essay it is not necessary to 
conclude that managers take advantage of this to harm others purposefully, but rather to 
point out that this creates a zone of impunity. If home states can create governance that 
protects mangers from decisions affecting people in other jurisdictions, then it is 
possible to create links that make them liable for damaging activity as well. There are 
other public governance possibilities as well, such as requiring labour representation on 
executive boards, as in Germany.
70
  
 ‘The important point here is to recognize that national corporate governance policies do 
 produce global governance effects and that a better understanding of those effects could 
 provide new avenues for policy-makers to shape transnational regulatory policy and 
 global social welfare.’
71
 
 There may be even further opportunities for states that host production to ensure 
social welfare. Again we must consider, for developing countries, are the governance 
gaps too large to overcome? And yet again, I assert that, if there are gaps currently, they 
were consciously created with the help of these states. Governments have ‘actively 
eroded labour rights’
72
 to attract foreign investment, and in competing with other 
countries to attract this investment have participated in a ‘race to the bottom.’
73
 States 
have also created export processing zones (EPZs) in which workers can be denied many 
of the protections offered by national laws. And many states fail to enforce the 
employment laws on the books. ‘Instead of ensuring fair and sustainable gains from 
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trade for workers, many governments are trading away workers’ rights in the hope of a 
place in global supply chains.’
74
 
 Yet some states have attempted to address the problem. In 2008 China passed 
the New Labour Contract Law by guaranteeing formal term contracts for employees 
that protect them from termination without just cause and grants them access to courts 
to protect these rights. This could have important ramifications in the long term, as it 
will stabilize employment for millions of workers but also potentially increase labour 
costs.
75
 This has already led to some buyers shifting to producers in Indonesia, Vietnam, 
and Cambodia, but it could still be significant in creating new industry standards.  
 Some public-private governance responses have also emerged. One such hybrid 
development is the Cambodia Better Factories Initiative, which combines private self-
regulation with state and international interventions. This originated with the US-
Cambodia Textile Agreement, which granted greater access to US markets for improved 
labour conditions.
76
 Another example of this is Nicaragua, which has maintained robust 
state policies in addition to implementing the Better Work initiative, which we will 
explore in further detail in the third chapter. 
 And in light of the economic downturn beginning in 2008, Nathan and Sakar 
have argued that states are beginning to recognize that more robust public governance is 
crucial not just for workers’ rights but for macroeconomic stability.  
 ‘This is a generally neglected dimension in the discussion of the ongoing global 
 crisis… a low share of wages needs to be compensated by a correspondingly high level 
 of investment. A key feature of the imbalance in the current global crisis is the rise in 
 profits as a share of total global income. Correcting this imbalance, through an increase 




 It is clear that an increasing number of states are beginning to come to terms 
with the pitfalls of global trade; and as the entrenched neo-liberal orthodoxy recedes, 
governments are realizing they need not sacrifice their regulatory regimes and social 
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protections in order to promote economic upgrading. However, the actualization of such 
a realization depends both on government responses to domestic social pressures in 
addition to their leverage relative to other global market actors. ‘Clearly what might be 
possible for China because of its size might not be possible for Guatemala, for example, 




 Yet there is a strong argument that even very poor national governments have 
more power to impose their will than previously thought.
79
 This power has only 
increased following the global economic crisis, as developing countries are taking on a 
more prominent role in driving the economy. Large brands are beginning to sell goods 
back to consumers in the regions where they were produced. This North to South shift 
in economic power holds great possibilities, if only these rising states are willing to 
protect workers.
80
 Also, many Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, Brazil, 
Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Bolivia, have recently experienced populist movements 
against neo-liberal policies and reasserted labour rights.
81
 
 Of course, as mentioned above, the state is not an inherently benevolent actor, 
but the public stage remains a far more promising arena to struggle for improvements. It 
is the only stage on which the workers themselves can access political participation, 
which is a basic tenet of justice according to Fraser. Additionally, citizens of countries 
where corporations are domiciled can also pressure their governments to provide more 
robust protections for workers in powerful mechanisms such as trade agreements. The 
following two chapters will explore in much further detail the extent to which these 
agreements impact the lives of workers. 
 
V. THE PERSISTENT POWER OF STATES 
The notion that states are not able to act as regulators in GVCs due to public governance 
gaps has been overblown. Deficits still exist, of course, but state power remains far-
reaching and holds great potential. I have argued that public institutions offer the most 
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promising platform for struggle because states are more responsive to political pressure 
than corporations. Fraser’s theory of justice demands ‘parity of participation,’ and 
because political participation is best achieved in a public framework, efforts to achieve 
economic redistribution and cultural recognition within GVCs must be focused on 
public regimes. 
 In the following chapter, I will discuss a plethora of data which reveals the 
extent to which states have participated in creating the current structures of global trade 
in order to discuss how it is we might move forward in struggling for workers’ rights. 
Although a global context will always be presented, much of the discussion will centre 
on developments in Latin America, a region whose fate has largely been determined by 
US interests. Also, various industries will be considered, but much of this paper focuses 
specifically on apparel, an industry that has proven essential for economic upgrading 
around the world due to low barriers for entry and the multitude of preferential access to 























I. APPAREL IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 
Apparel is a crucial sector for developing countries because it often serves as a gateway 
to economic development.
82
 Entry barriers are relatively low compared to more 
sophisticated industries such as IT, and natural resources are minimal compared to 
agriculture, but labour needs are intensive and therefore bring much needed 
employment opportunities.  
 As discussed in the previous chapter, global value chain (GVC) analysis 
considers the value chain as the unit of analysis, rather than a country, firm, or worker. 
Meanwhile, different types of GVCs are made up of different levels of low-skill and 
high-skill production. There are five different types of work considered:
83
 small-scale 
household and home-based work (often found at the base of GVCs); low-skilled, 
labour-intensive work (wage labour on a commercial site); moderate-skilled, varied 
labour-intensity work (associated with full-package production where buyers control the 
orders but suppliers do much of the rest); high skilled, technology-intensive work 
(typically associated with electronics); and knowledge-intensive work (includes services 
like finance, software, and engineering). 
 The apparel industry consists mostly of household and low-skilled work, 
although moderate skilled, high skilled, and knowledge intensive jobs do exist in small 
proportions (likely due to the rising prevalence of full package production that is largely 
concentrated in the North). In this sense, apparel is most similar to agriculture. Thus, 
each industry consists of a different combination of work typologies. Some industries 
consist of many more knowledge-intensive jobs, but it’s also likely that those GVCs 
create fewer jobs than apparel or agriculture.
84
 
 Each type of work throughout a value chain has implications for economic and 
social upgrading.
85
 Irregular workers, often primarily women and migrants, are less 
likely to have the kinds of enabling rights that lead to measurable standards. Third-party 
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contract workers are increasingly used in apparel and agriculture, both labour-intensive 
and seasonal. Contractors are often used to match workers with employers when 
needed. While contractors can help workers achieve a certain continuity of work by 




 The central theme of this chapter is how state policies impact what types of 
work are created in the apparel industry. More to the point, this chapter explores the 
effects of state trade policies on the livelihoods of apparel workers. I begin with a 
historical explanation of the emergence of apparel trade policies, then transition to a 
detailed discussion of the various ways in which state policies have affected workers on 
the ground. The macro data utilised to ground this discussion is by no means ideal – and 
it is presented with many qualifications – but it is instructive in exploring how state 
policies relate to broader trends in economic and social upgrading. In general, by 
exploring the extent to which broad state trade policies impact the individual worker, 
the goal is to bolster the idea that states retain the ability to address human rights 
violations in GVCs.  
 
II. HOW WE GOT HERE: APPAREL AND THE HISTORY OF THE QUOTA 
REGIME  
In all global value chains, but especially apparel chains, it is difficult to overstate the 
impact of state policy initiatives. The apparel industry has long been one of the most 
involved players in lobbying for national and international trade regulations, and it is 
also one of the most protected industries.
87
  
 ‘For buyers, suppliers, and workers in global value chains, the sourcing, production, 
 and consumption of clothing is shaped as much by a myriad of complex and often 
 technical details embedded in trade agreements, tariff structures, and customs 
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 The result on the ground is that buying and selling arrangements between 
manufacturers and buyers must be negotiated under the constraints of complex 
regulations on preferential access, tariffs, and rules of origin, and agricultural subsidies 
on input materials like cotton, wool, and rayon. Therefore, these complex regulations 
ultimately impact the manner and avenues in which buyers can exploit the market and 
manufacturers can participate in economic or social upgrading.  
 Pickles has identified three primary drivers of bargaining in apparel trade policy: 
defensive, competitive, and persuasive/coercive.
89
 Apparel companies in developed 
markets have been defensive in order to protect their advantage over foreign 
competitors. Specifically, when the quota system and trade liberalisation led to a 
dramatic rise in outsourcing, US and EU manufacturers lobbied to ensure they remained 
the primary input suppliers for off-shore sewing operations, which resulted in a series of 
quotas, safeguards, rules of origin, duties, and tariffs. 
  Meanwhile, retail and consumer groups became drivers of more competitive 
trade policies, lobbying for greater trade liberalisation in order to reduce production 
costs. Many manufacturers in developing countries, interested in upgrading their own 
industry, joined this chorus, pushing for lower tariffs and duty-free market access. 
Additionally, developing governments often supported these policies in order to gain 
access to major markets.   
 Government agencies and civil society groups have served as the coercive and 
persuasive forces impacting trade policy, negotiating to ensure that trade policies 
protect broader social and economic ends. These might include side agreements on 
labour rights, working conditions, and environmental standards, or punitive measures 
for human rights abuses or unfair trading practices.  
 The implementation and eventual removal of quotas on apparel imports into the 
major markets of the EU, US, and other industrial countries such as Canada, Japan, and 
Australia is widely considered the most important policy change on apparel trade in the 
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 These policies protected major economies, increased the growth and 
dominance of lead firms in global value chains, allowed poor economies to become 
exporters, and created important geo-political mechanisms for post-colonial states. 
These mechanisms included a bevy of trade agreements.  
 Beginning in 1957 Japan voluntarily imposed quotas on cotton textile exports to 
the US in order to appease US textile manufacturers that had grown concerned about the 
rise of imports.
91
 This served as a model for two temporary quota arrangements created 
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1961 and 1962. These 
agreements were further extended under the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) in 1974, 
which evolved further under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
(ATC) beginning in 1995. While the original intent of the MFA was to protect jobs in 




 The resulting quota regime was complex and product-specific, establishing rules 
that preserved the use of US and EU fibre, yarn, and fabric inputs, and lowered barriers 
to market access for producers in developing countries. As a result, traditionally 
dominant manufacturing centres diminished and gave rise to low-wage employment in 
export platforms, border zones, and special economic zones (SEZs) around the world. 
Thus, quotas gave rise to the global fragmentation of apparel value chains, in which 
manufacturers in low-wage states sewed imported apparel components in order to re-
export the finished product. Once a state reached its quota limit, apparel production was 
sub-contracted to other developing economies. This led to increased employment 
opportunities around the world. At the same time, apparel wages were squeezed down 
and resulted in new forms of labour, such as weakened work contracts and dependence 
on young female and migrant workers.
93
 Also, many developing economies became 
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 The structure of national trade policies also created barriers for social and 
economic upgrading in many supplier factories.
95
 Economic upgrading often depends 
on a shift to full-package production, but opportunities to achieve this were limited by 
trade policies such as rules of origin (RoO).
96
    
 The ATC began removing preferential access to major economies in 1995 and 
allowed producers in the developing world quota-free access to these markets, but the 
majority of these quotas were not lifted until 2005.
97
 Thus, a seismic shift in production, 
employment, and trade occurred. While production expanded across developing 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s, Asian countries were the overwhelming beneficiaries 
when quotas were removed, and massive unemployment resulted in other dependent 
regions.
98
 Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam experienced 
economic upgrading, while many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Central America 
lost out.  
 It is worth mentioning two related developments during this time. First, it is 
clear that the dependence of many countries on global apparel trade – created in large 
part by the quota regime – has indirect effects on these countries. The 2008 financial 
crisis had fewer negative effects on those countries that successfully negotiated the end 
of quotas, while those that were most negatively affected by quota removals also 
suffered the most from the economic crisis.
99
 Second, corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives failed to counter the deleterious effects of post-quota shifts in the 
apparel trade or damages incurred by the financial crisis, while state intervention was 
essential to the positive developments seen in Bangladesh, China, India, and 
Nicaragua.
100
 This points to the increased need for public governance in global trade.  
 In large part, the removal of quotas led to footloose sourcing and what is often 
considered a race to the bottom. Buyers were now permitted to source from the country 
or region that promised the lowest production costs. While this increased employment 
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in some developing economies, at the same time countries began the rapid removal of 
social protections to lure buyers. This led to, among other things, poor working 
conditions, low wages, child labour, and environmental damage,
101
 not to mention the 
constant threat of buyer pull-out resulting in the sudden evisceration of jobs. This threat 
has naturally led to shorter contracts and higher demands without commensurate 
increases in pay, while responsibility for social protections has been distributed across a 
growing spectrum of actors.
102
   
 There are some signs, however, that the race to the bottom is slowing, as some 
brand-name companies are seeking to improve quality and decrease potential harm to 
their reputation by condensing supply chains and sourcing from select producers.
103
 In 
this regard, state initiatives have played an important role in countries such as China, 
which has enacted proactive labour reforms to improve working conditions.
104
 
However, we must also consider that many countries do not have the leverage needed to 
implement stronger governance. We will turn to these countries shortly. 
 Thus, when we consider arguments for how to approach economic and social 
upgrading initiatives we must take into account the control exerted by these trade 
policies. Attempts at social upgrading are limited by the fragmented nature of global 
value chains – for example, integrated apparel factories hold more potential than 
disaggregated factories  – yet the nature of global value chains was largely created by 
national trade policies to begin with. Thus, arguments that posit that quota removal has 
led to a race to the bottom, and that the race is difficult to regulate because of the 
governance gaps created by the resulting fragmentation, are largely missing the point. 
That is, the gaps were not happenstance results of an uncontrollable economic 
phenomenon; rather, they are consequences of targeted policies meant to protect 
specific interests. If the current state of global value chains is an unwieldy monster, its 
masters and creators have thus far been protected as intended, while many of those 
attempting to cross the bridge to economic prosperity are battered and bruised after 
being swatted away from the riches. In other words, ‘the specific types and geographies 
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of production and employment that have been produced by such buyer-driven chains 




 This points to a wider argument presented throughout this thesis, which is that 
rampant violations in global value chains are best addressed by public governance 
mechanisms. Of course, in this short history we have seen examples of governments 
eroding labour rights, which contributes to the complexity of the issue at hand. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, governments are not inherently benevolent actors, but 
still they hold the greatest potential for addressing human rights violations in value 
chains. Despite arguments that governments are unable to regulate global commerce – 
i.e. governance gaps – there is repeated evidence that governments participated in this 
erosion and therefore hold some power to reverse course. Developing countries may be 
reticent to do so, but this is largely because of pressures from corporations and 
governments in developed countries. However, close consideration reveals that there is 
less evidence of a governance gap than consciously created zones of impunity, which 
enable corporations to act with little restraint. Convincing governments in both 
developed and developing countries to address these problems may not be a simple task, 
but this does not mean that they have lost the power to do so. 
 It is also of great importance to note that, if governance gaps do exist, they are 
not universally applicable. While some states retain great control over patterns and 
geographies of trade, some states remain vulnerable and unable to leverage their own 
interests on an even playing field with the world’s most powerful economies.   
 We turn now from a historical consideration of apparel regulations to a more 
detailed and complex consideration of quotas and national and international trade 
policies. This is necessary to grapple with the wide-ranging impacts of state initiatives 
on economic and social upgrading. For example, end markets in the US and EU differ 
markedly, in order sizes, delivery timing, quality, penalties for delays, price, and even 
differences in currency exchange rates.
106
 In some cases, dependency on particular end 
markets is a matter of geography. Latin American countries are highly dependent on the 
                                                          
105
 Ibid 25. 
106





US, and African countries are dependent on Europe (although there are exceptions, such 
as increasing African internal trade and other examples of South to South trade).  
 Yet, we must consider even further the complexity involved in the flourish of 
multilateral, regional, bilateral and preferential trade agreements that create certain 
regulations on apparel trade. These lead to such phenomena as differentiated growth 
patterns and assembly-only contracting in particular areas, such as the maquiladora 
model in Mexico.
107
 In addition to MFA and ATC, these include, for example, the 
CAFTA-DR, NAFTA, AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act), EU EPAs 
(Economic Partnership Agreements), the US-Cambodia Textile Agreement, and the US-
Haiti HOPE agreement. It clearly emerges that despite the removal of quotas, there 
remains a dominance of regulations such as fabric forwarding rules
108
 that continue to 
present significant obstacles to both economic and social upgrading for many. Despite 
arguments to the country, it is clear that states retain strong regulatory control over 
global trade.    
 
III. DEFINING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL UPGRADING, BY THE NUMBERS 
Bernhardt has utilized data on imports and exports, national employment, and wages in 
order to map out specific country trends in economic and social upgrading or 
downgrading.
109
 There are, of course, serious limitations on what these types of data can 
reveal about economic and social upgrading. Bernhardt admittedly uses narrow 
definitions of economic and social upgrading for the practical purposes of data 
availability.  Also, the data collected for social upgrading is sectoral rather than value 
chain data, which can create a false picture.
110
 However, Bernhardt’s data remains 
useful because it offers a unique perspective on macro trends relating to the impact of 
state policies and trade agreements on the success of developing economies. Thus, 
although this presents a very constricted version of social upgrading, the macro trends 
still provide interesting insight.   




 This is an example of a preferential ROO, in which tariff-free access is granted to all apparel sewn in a 
signatory country from inputs that derive from within a designated region. 
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 Bernhardt characterizes economic upgrading according to two data sets.
111
 First, 
economic upgrading occurs when there is an increase in a country’s world export 
market share, which is reflective of its international competitiveness. Second, there is an 
increase in a country’s export unit value, indicating the production of higher-value 
products. Of course, rising export unit values do not necessarily imply higher-value 
products; there is also the possibility of higher production costs caused by a multitude 
of factors (including changes in preferential trade agreements). At the same time, 
increasing world export market share does not itself imply economic upgrading, as a 
country could simply be surging ahead in terms of total exports without actually 
upgrading their economic development. Therefore, it is crucial for Bernhardt’s data to 
consider export unit value in addition to export market share. 
 Similarly, Bernhardt uses two indicators to measure social upgrading: an 
increase in sectoral employment and an increase in sectoral real wages. Again, the use 
of sectoral data must be qualified because exports – the products considered in GVCs – 
are bunched together with domestic production. However, the data still provides an 
interesting macro consideration of general trends in the industry. According to 
Bernhardt, 
 ‘The rationale for choosing these two indicators of social upgrading is fairly 
 straightforward: through the creation of jobs, labour is given the possibility to earn 
 income – which potentially helps workers in developing countries move out of poverty 
 and thereby contributes to social well-being.’
112
  
 The justification for using real wages as complementary data is that they 
indicate how much workers actually benefit from increased employment. Essentially, 
there is a stark difference between a job and a good job, or between sweatshop labour 
and employment that enables a worker to provide for his or her family. But Bernhardt 
goes even further, claiming that real wages ‘give an idea of labour’s bargaining power 
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 Bernhardt does offer a qualification here, stating that real wages ‘are not always 
and not necessarily an indication of improved working conditions.’
114
 However, he 




 Before moving further, greater nuance must be considered for this definition of 
social upgrading. The goal of exploring a broader view of social upgrading is not to 
discredit Bernhardt’s indicators of social upgrading, but rather to pinpoint its limitations 
(which Bernhardt himself is well aware of). Sen is commonly used as a base 
understanding of social upgrading,
116
 and although Sen’s conception could never be 
captured using quantitative data, it is worth considering what that view looks like.  
 
IV. SEN AND SOCIAL UPGRADING 
To address the distributive problems associated with measuring development according 
to gross domestic product (GDP), poverty lines have been established to determine 
whether economic policies are mitigating the breadth and severity of poverty. Those 
falling below the line can thus be targeted with development policies. While this may 
solve some of the issues related to GDP as a measurement tool, even more problems 
become immediately evident. There are no objective criteria to set a poverty line, so 
value judgments must be made.
117
 Where should the line be drawn? Are we only to 
consider extreme poverty, or can poor peoples in developed countries also fall below 
the line based on their relative income? Even further, there remain distributional 
problems to consider. Each person cannot convert equivalent goods into equivalent 
livelihoods, so should the poverty line be weighted to consider those with disabilities, or 
those with higher metabolisms that require more calories, or women that suffer from 
gender discrimination within family units? To push the point a bit further, this 
measurement of poverty fails to consider the basic humanity of the persons involved. 
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The poverty line does not consider whether a person is able to paint a picture, read a 
novel, vote in an election, or take a walk in a tree-lined park.  
 Sen has provided the most powerful argument against this dominant narrative of 
poverty and development. He argues that poverty is capability deprivation, or the 
inability of a person to reach their ‘full human potential’ due to lack of resources or 
structural barriers of all sorts.
118
 This extends far beyond financial realms to include 
considerations of education, gender bias, and political participation. The aim of 
development, according to Sen, is not to raise GDP but to expand human freedoms. 
This is partly why the kinds of quantitative data utilised by Bernhardt will always fail to 
capture the full picture of social upgrading.  
 The key to understanding the radical shift proposed by Sen’s capabilities 
approach is his conceptualisation of the ends and means of development, or what he 
terms the ‘constitutive and instrumental roles of freedom.’
119
 In Sen’s approach, 
increasing freedom is both constitutive and instrumental to development. The 
constitutive role of development includes basic freedoms like proper nourishment and 
avoiding preventable death, but also education, political participation, and the 
enjoyment of gender equity. Meanwhile, these freedoms are also instrumental to 
development, because they may bolster economic progress. Countries with robust 
education systems, for example, may experience growth as a result of their public 
investment, but providing education constitutes development in itself, regardless of 
whether economic progress follows. The distinction is crucial in our understanding of 
development, but also in how we view poverty. Poor persons are no longer the 
charitable beneficiaries of economic growth, but rather deserve freedoms simply 
because they are human. Also, when considering global trade, this therefore challenges 
the assumption that social upgrading must follow economic upgrading. 
 This conception of poverty literally turns on its head the traditionally held view 
of development, in which access to basic systems of education and health care were 
seen as luxuries to be enjoyed by all only after the requisite economic growth had 
occurred. Sen cites several examples of the backwardness of this approach, in which he 
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points out that not only are expanded freedoms often the foundation of successful 
economies but also that growth is not necessary for substantial investment in social 
programs.
120
 The Indian state of Kerala is one such example. Despite limited growth the 
government decided to invest in social programs that yielded remarkable expansion of 
freedoms. Sen also points to wartime Britain, which created its National Health Service 
and decreased undernourishment in spite of a sluggish economy. This also challenges 
the idea that small, developing countries are unable to protect the human rights of their 
citizens in GPNs, that they are powerless when faced with the demands of powerful 
corporations and the economies where they are based. That challenge remains 
significant, but this notion points to potential alternatives.   
 Sen’s theory is not without critics, however. For our purposes, it is important to 
note that there are serious questions as to whether any kind of data can be used to 
measure Sen’s understanding of development – which is often conceived as the base 
understanding of social upgrading – not just Bernhardt’s data. One of the central 
problems with Sen’s theory is that it is not clearly measurable in any way, and this is 
why Bernhardt’s data, though limited, is still helpful in improving our understanding of 
broad trends in economic and social upgrading.   
 Factors contributing to social upgrading or downgrading include the position of 
workers, different types of work, and employment status. Employment conditions are 
consistently better for permanent workers, and often women have less access to these 
kinds of work.
121
 Also, conditions are better for workers in factories that are monitored 
regularly. Social upgrading in low-skilled assembly plants is more challenging than full-
package production because the latter requires more skilled employees and permanent 
work. Also, chains led by brand names are more likely to promote social upgrading out 
of concern for their image. 
 When considered in the proper context, the data contributes to an understanding 
of just how much the economic health of trade in the developing world depends upon 
state policies in the US and EU. This understanding enables us to further clarify that 
focusing on public governance is imperative to remedy the abuses that occur throughout 
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global value chains. The kinds of restrictions or preferential access spelled out in 
bilateral and regional trade agreements contributes to the ability of developing 
economies to promote economic and social upgrading. In effect, even if trade 
agreements bolster economic growth in a developing country (and this is not always the 
case), obstacles to social upgrading may remain entrenched due to the types of trade 
promoted or discouraged in trade agreements. Abuses in global value chains cannot be 
addressed without first considering these complexities at the core of trade.  
 
V. ECONOMIC UPGRADING IN THE APPAREL INDUSTRY 
Bernhardt considers countries in three regions – Africa, Asia, and Central America and 
the Caribbean – paying particular attention to the ruptures and structural changes that 
occurred in the wake of quota removals. The dramatic evolution of value chains 
following quotas reveals the extent to which state policies shaped international trade 
under the old regime. These changes led to the increasing emphasis on production and 
labour costs, lead times, and flexibility. However, we will also see that states still play a 
significant role in the post-quota world by shaping markets and trade patterns through 
tariffs and various trade agreements. Apparel production falls nicely under what Gereffi 
has termed buyer-led value chains, thus it’s not surprising that developing countries are 
10 of the world’s top 15 apparel exporters.
122
 All but two of those developing countries 
are Asian, with Mexico (11
th
) and Morocco (15
th
) being the exceptions.  
 In general, apparel exports in Asian countries have trended upward throughout 
the 2000s, while African and Latin American and Caribbean countries have trended 
downwards.
123
 Yet, there are some exceptions to these patterns. In Asia, Sri Lanka lost 
market share. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Haiti and Nicaragua gained market 
share. In Africa, Kenya and Lesotho increased their share. For many Asian countries, 
such as China, India, and Bangladesh, growth can be linked directly to the end of the 
MFA because they were no longer limited by quotas. But the more complex trends of 
other regions suggests that state trade policies maintain a strong hold on the structure of 
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value chains. This emerges clearly when considering the first of Bernhardt’s two 
indicators of economic upgrading: world export market shares (see Table 1 below).  
 






 In Africa, for example, Kenya and Lesotho experienced significant growth in 
apparel exports and market shares from 2000 to 2010. Kenya exported about $50 
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million in apparel in 2000, and that number rose to over $220 million in 2010 (world 
export market share rose from 0.03 to 0.07 per cent). In Lesotho, apparel exports 
totalled over $150 million in 2000 and nearly $320 million by 2010 (market share rose 
from 0.08 to 0.10 per cent). However, a more nuanced picture emerges when trends are 
considered before and after quota removals in 2004. For both of these countries, apparel 
exports increased dramatically from 2000 to 2004, largely due to the African Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in 2000, which granted preferential access to US markets 
for several African countries. The benefits of this clearly emerge in the data. Kenya 
apparel exports jumped from $50 million in 2000 to over $300 million in 2004 (market 
share rose from 0.03 to 0.12 per cent). Similarly, Lesotho apparel exports skyrocketed 
from just over $150 million in 2000 to nearly $500 million in 2004 (0.08 to 0.20 per 
cent). However, when quotas were removed these countries lost their comparative 
advantage to Asian countries, and many ‘MFA quota-hopping firms’ relocated as a 
result.
125
 Since 2004, therefore, Kenya and Lesotho steadily declined in apparel market 
share.  
 In terms of Bernhardt’s second economic upgrading indicator, growth of export 
unit values, increases are more pervasive (see Table 2 below). Nearly all countries 
exported apparel at a higher cost per unit in 2010 than in 2000. The only exceptions are 
found in the Latin American and Caribbean region, where the Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua saw decreasing apparel export unit values, while 
Guatemala was essentially stagnant in this regard. However, when considering only the 
second half of the decade, gains are even more widespread: even El Salvador and Haiti 
increased their export unit values. This is itself a surprising trend considering that the 
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 According to Bernhardt’s matrix of economic upgrading, which requires 
increases in both market share and export unity values, seven countries are considered 
economic upgraders. Six of these are Asian, with Haiti being the only exception. Haiti 
has benefitted from duty-free access to US markets and less stringent (RoO) due to the 
Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership for Encouragement (HOPE) Act.
127
 For 
Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Cambodia, economic upgrading following 2004 was not 
inevitable, since their apparel industries were developed largely as a result of quota 
hopping before 2004 and the removal of quotas presented a serious threat of job 
removal.
128
 However, these countries successfully manoeuvred to turn low labour costs 
into a competitive advantage and enjoy preferential access to EU markets. Also, the 
apparel industry in Bangladesh and Vietnam benefitted from state initiatives that 
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invested in supply chains and improved delivery times and competitiveness.
129
 Success 
in China and India are less surprising, as both countries have invested heavily to 
improve their infrastructure and textile productions, while they also benefitted from a 
growing domestic market due to a rising middle class.
130
 
 On the other hand, Bernhardt’s data suggests that only two of the countries 
sampled were outright economic downgraders: Kenya and the Dominican Republic.
131
 
Bernhardt attributes Kenya’s poor performance to the turnabout of quota-hoppers after 
the MFA removal, while he argues that the Dominican Republic lost out after the quota 
phase-out because their primary competitive advantage was proximity to the US.
132
 The 
resulting dependency on US markets proved troublesome after the phase-out when US 
buyers looked elsewhere. Also, the Dominican Republic has been hurt by unfavourable 
components of the DR-CAFTA, which will be considered more closely in a later 
section.  
 All remaining countries were deemed ‘intermediate cases,’
133
 and all but one 
experienced rising export unit values and declining market shares. (Nicaragua is the 
only intermediate case that experienced the inverse phenomenon – decreasing unit 
values and increased market share – and it will be explored in further detail later on.) 
The experiences of the apparel industries in each of these countries vary widely, 
however. South Africa, for example, has lost export market share but has increased 
domestic sales dramatically, signalling a shift towards South to South production and 
end markets.
134
 Also, Sri Lanka has moved from lower-value to higher-value export 
products, such as lingerie, so export market share has been lost while unit values are 
increasing.
135
 Mexico’s situation is quite different, however. Bernhardt concludes that 
rising export unit values reflect increasing production costs rather than product 
upgrading, largely due to the legacy of NAFTA and the maquiladora model. Of course, 
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such generalisations are not conclusive because Bernhardt is using sectoral rather than 





VI. SOCIAL UPGRADING IN THE APPAREL INDUSTRY 
His findings were less promising for social upgrading. Considering the first indicator of 
social upgrading (Table 3), increases in apparel employment, patterns are not surprising. 
Since the MFA removal, Asian countries have enjoyed widespread gains in 
employment, with the lone exception of Indonesia. However, after quota removal 
Indonesia experienced an employment increase of 6 per cent. On the other hand, Sri 
Lanka experienced a zero per cent change in employment during the same period, with 
a loss in jobs from 2004 to 2009. Yet, with Sri Lanka’s shift to higher-value apparel 
production discussed above, a small loss of employment is to be expected. The 
remaining Asian countries experienced tremendous job growth.  
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 Meanwhile, for countries in Africa and Central America and the Caribbean, 
apparel job losses have been nearly as dramatic as Asian gains. The Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, and South Africa have seen the sharpest declines, at 70 per cent, 60 
per cent, and 59 per cent respectively. Many of these countries began suffering from 
losses in 2000, but job loss accelerated swiftly after 2004. For example, the Dominican 
Republic lost 7 per cent of its apparel jobs from 2000 to 2004, but it lost 68 per cent 
from 2004 to 2009. Guatemala actually experienced a 28 per cent employment increase 
from 2000 to 2004, then a 49 per cent loss from 2004 to 2009.  
 In these two regions, however, there are two exceptions. Lesotho saw 
employment increases of 100 per cent over the entire decade, but that was due to growth 
experienced prior to quota removal (spurred by AGOA), as it actually lost 29 per cent of 
jobs from 2004 to 2009. Nicaragua has actually maintained the most consistent job 
growth of any country – 27 percent from 2000 to 2004 and 26 per cent from 2004 to 
2009 – but that is largely attributable to preferential access to US markets that will be 
explored in further detail in a later section. 
 Using Bernhardt’s second indicator of social upgrading, real wages, patterns 
were more varied. Asian countries again performed the best, with the notable exceptions 
of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Bangladeshi apparel wages have decreased by 43 per cent 
over the decade, although decreases slowed dramatically after 2004 (a decline of 4 per 
cent from 2004 to 2009). Declining real wages have been steadier, though far less 
damaging, with a 10 per cent loss from 2000 to 2009. China, India, Indonesia, and 
Jordan have made impressive improvements in average annual real wages. Chinese 
wages have received a huge bump, nearly 200 per cent between 2000 and 2009. This is 
largely due to strengthened labour laws, currency appreciation and general economic 
growth in the country. While wages have increased, China has also been able to 
maintain employment gains and increase market shares due to substantial investments 
in value chains and infrastructure.
138
  
 In the African region, each country saw rises in real wages in apparel from 2000 
to 2009, though increases were slowed substantially or reversed after 2004. From 2004 
to 2009, real wages in Kenya and Lesotho declined, while Mauritius had a zero per cent 
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increases and growth in South Africa slowed from 37 per cent during 2000 to 2004 to 
17 per cent from 2004 to 2009.  
 In Central America and the Caribbean, patterns of real wage increases and 
decreases moved in the opposite direction than in Africa. Real wages declined or 
increased slowly from 2000 to 2004 and increased substantially after 2004. The 
Dominican Republic was the only country whose real wages declined between 2000 and 
2009, but that is due to a 41 per cent decline from 2000 to 2004. After quota removal, 
real wages increased 62 percent through 2009. (These fluctuating numbers in the 
Dominican Republic may be due in large part to capricious currency exchange rates 
over time rather than strictly apparel production practices.
139
) During these two periods, 
real wage increases jumped from 4 per cent to 36 per cent in El Salvador, 2 per cent to 7 
per cent in Mexico, and 29 per cent to 77 per cent in Nicaragua.  
 
VII. A LINK BETWEEN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL UPGRADING? 
Bernhardt concludes that, considering the two indicators of social upgrading in tandem, 
social upgrading is much more elusive then economic upgrading following the MFA 
phase-out (Table 4 below).
140
 Only four countries were categorical social upgraders: 
China, India, Jordan, and Nicaragua all experienced increases in employment and real 
wages in the apparel sector during this period. All of the sampled African countries, 
plus Guatemala and Sri Lanka, were clear-cut social downgraders, while the remaining 
countries were intermediate cases. The remainder of Asian countries increased 
employment and wages declined. Meanwhile, Mexico, the Dominican Republic, and El 
Salvador saw a decline in employment but a rise and wages. When compared with the 
economic upgrading indicators, a clear pattern emerges with this final group of 
countries. In El Salvador and Mexico, export market share losses resulted in job losses, 
and rising wages resulted in higher export unit values. Also, the Dominican Republic 
experienced both the biggest decline of export market shares in addition to the largest 
job loss. 
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 However, because social upgrading was much more difficult to achieve, it is 
clear that the link between economic and social upgrading is tenuous. Five countries 
achieved overall economic and social upgrading between 2004 and 2009, and Nicaragua 
was the only non-Asian country to do so. On the other hand, four countries managed to 
become economic upgraders without social upgrading. One of these countries, Haiti, 
actually performed the absolute worst in social indicators despite economic upgrading. 
As mentioned earlier, many other countries realized better economic gains than in the 
social realm. Increasing apparel export competitiveness reveals little about how gains 
are distributed, thus the importance of considering the links between economic and 
social upgrading is paramount. Much research relies on the assumption that economic 
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upgrading leads directly to social upgrading, but Bernhardt’s data reveals that this is not 
necessarily true. Other research has supported this.
142
 
 There are even some cases of economic downgrading linked to social 
upgrading.
143
 Yet it is also crucial to note that patters of economic and social upgrading 
vary widely across different industries.
144
 It is more common in apparel and horticulture 
to find a positive correlation between economic and social upgrading. The mobile 
phone industry often leads to economic upgrading without social upgrading, while in 
tourism there are cases of social upgrading without economic upgrading.  
 In all major export industries except apparel, for example, evidence suggests 
that growth in world export market share generally brings about economic upgrading.
145
 
Also, in apparel and horticulture, there is a positive link between economic and social 
upgrading, while this is not the case in mobile phone and tourism value chains.
146
 Social 
upgrading was the most elusive in the mobile phone sector, where employment gains 
were consistent but did not coincide with wage increases.
147
 Social upgrading was 
common in the tourism industry and widely varied in the apparel industry. Across all 
industries, gains in employment were much more common than wage growth. 
 Recall that the previous chapter discussed multiple types of economic 
upgrading.
148
 There is both a capital dimension – new technologies – and a labour 
dimension – skill development. There is therefore a connection between economic and 
social upgrading, but they involve different dimensions, and economic upgrading does 
not automatically lead to social upgrading. There is also a range of possible trajectories 
for social upgrading.
149
 For example, one such trajectory is small-scale worker 
upgrading, in which workers continue with home-based production but benefit from 
improvements in working conditions. In labour-intensive upgrading, workers move to 
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better types of labour intensive work, such as moving from subsistence agriculture to 
factory jobs with responsible labour codes. In higher-skill upgrading, workers move 
into better paid, higher skilled sectors such as tourism and IT.  
 Correlations between economic and social upgrading are interesting to consider, 
because there are competing pressures when buyers demand both higher quality and 
lower costs.
150
 Functional upgrading to achieve higher quality products, such as full 
package production, might imply social upgrading because it formalizes the labour 
force, but continued pressures to decrease costs may lead to social downgrading.  
 In the apparel industry the data suggests there may be some positive correlation 
between economic and social conditions. Bernhardt points to the fact that, within his 
sample set, social and economic performance does coincide in thirteen out of eighteen 
countries.
151
 Yet due to the variation found in the five other cases, he concludes that 




  It is also worth noting that the worst social performers were those most strongly 
affected by the MFA phase-out and the 2008 economic crisis. More to the point, the 
evidence points to the notion that those most harmed by quota removals were left even 
more vulnerable to the economic downturn, while those that benefitted from quota 




VIII. WHY ASIA WINS AND CENTRAL AMERICA LOSES 
What is missing from the discussion thus far is a deeper exploration of why certain 
countries experienced better results than others. It is clear that results are highly varied 
across and even within regions. While the removal of quotas explains a great deal about 
the fragmentation of supply chains, and even something about the diversification of 
trade across the globe, there is more to be explored regarding why certain regions and 
individual countries have performed better than others in the apparel trade. What clearly 
emerges in this highly diversified picture is that state policies – both domestic laws and 
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international trade agreements – continue to hold great power over the fate of 
developing (and developed) economies. This will be explored in the following chapter.   
 
CHAPTER 3 
I. UNEVEN FREE TRADE 
It would seem that the removal of quotas in 2004, the elimination of a slew of trade 
restrictions, and increased liberalisation would have ushered in an era of simpler 
sourcing, buying, and selling across apparel value chains. However, the opposite has 
occurred. The elimination of quotas has given rise to the implementation of multiple 
regional, bilateral and unilateral trade agreements in their wake. These agreements 
included preferential schemes with specific apparel clauses that complicated trade even 
while quotas were being phased out. Rules of origin, differential tariffs, and the specific 
demands of markets – US versus European, and increasingly Southern economies like 
Brazil, South Africa, and India – have meant that the role of state policy in the global 
apparel trade is as decisive as ever.  
 While there were fewer than 25 free trade agreements (FTAs) in 1958, they 
exceeded 300 by 2003.
154
 The variety and complexity of FTAs has led to highly 
differentiated levels of employment growth and decline in developing economies, not to 
mention multifarious patterns of economic and social upgrading overall. Some of the 
most prominent regional trade agreements (RTAs) include NAFTA and CAFTA-DR, 
and significant unilateral preference arrangements include the AGOA and the EU’s 
GSP.  
 Even a value chain’s end market harbours a significant impact on that network’s 
labour conditions. For US buyers, China is the closest Asian market, but for EU buyers 
China is the furthest destination. Distance to market creates certain advantages via 
shipping time and costs, so geography can determine which end market a country might 
become most dependent on. In turn, that impacts apparel production practices. For 
example, EU and US buyers differ in the size of their orders. EU buyers tend to contract 
for smaller volumes than US buyers, so this determines which suppliers are able to 
                                                          
154
 John Pickles, ‘Economic and social upgrading in apparel global value chains: public governance 





leverage their position for certain types of upgrading.
155
 Larger volume and longer 
contracts for suppliers may create opportunities to pass down some gains to employees.  
 Supplier industries also develop in different ways based on the duty rates of 
importers. The EU maintains higher import duties for China than most Asian countries, 
while US duty rates are flat among Asian exporters. US preferential access rules have 
strict rules of origin dictating that US suppliers use US yarns in their production – 
raising costs – or they must follow complicated application procedures to US Customs 
and Border Control, which can slow the production process. On the other hand, EU 




 The consequences of state policies can also have more immediate and dramatic 
consequences. Following quota removal at the end of 2004, Chinese apparel exports 
increased so dramatically that the US and EU utilised the safeguard clause in China’s 
WTO accession and restricted import growth in the three years after 2004. Chinese 
suppliers reached the full year’s quota almost immediately, and in August 2005 75 
million items were held in European ports, leading to job loss in Chinese factories.
157
 
 Beginning in the 1980s the US and EU implemented special customs that 
allowed companies to export textiles to developing countries, where low-wage workers 
would sew them into garments, then re-import the completed item. Duties were only 
charged on the value added (i.e. the cost of labour), the effect of which was to maintain 
the high value yarn and fabric portions of the apparel industry in wealthy countries and 
outsource low value labour to the poorest countries. These policies also made economic 
upgrading more elusive because full-package production became prohibitively more 
expensive, also leading to less sustainable and lower quality employment. 
 The European outward processing trade (OPT) accomplished this by shipping 
fabric and trim to nearby developing countries in North Africa and Eastern Europe. The 
US 807 trade law, implemented under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) in 1984, 
exempted US fabrics from import duties. The import savings were so advantageous that 
maquiladora production quickly expanded across Central America, a boon for 
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American textile producers. By 2004 over half of US textile exports were sent to the 




 There are multiple types of import rules utilised by the US and EU:  
 Yarn forward rules grant receive duty free benefits to imports only if the apparel 
is made from yarn within the free trade area.  
 Tariff preference levels (TPLs) qualify a limited number of units for duty relief 
with inputs from outside the free trade area.  
 Commercial necessity rules allow inputs from countries outside the free trade 
area if it can be demonstrated that suitable inputs are not available from 
qualifying countries.  
 Rules of non-reciprocal preferential agreements enable duty relief from 
qualifying countries as long as the majority of inputs originate in the US. This 
was utilised in the CBI and AGOA.  
 Lastly, qualifying industrial zones (QIZs) offer the highest levels of access to 
US markets. Tariff and quota free access is granted to US markets, and this 
supersedes any other free trade agreements. The stated aim of designing QIZs 




 Overall, the impacts of trade policies originating in the Global North clearly 
emerge:  
 ‘At the regional level, North-South RTAs structured the conditions under which “the 
 economy” of the global value chain emerged, creating complex regulatory and 
 governance landscapes of opportunity and constraint for firms and countries… In this 
 sense, we can argue that these content rules (that is, inputs sourced from the preference-
 giving country) produced the global value chain and the fragmentation of production 
 activities on which it is predicated.’
160
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 This arrangement has been immensely beneficial to EU and US fibre, yarn, and 
fabric manufacturers, while is has severely limited the apparel manufacturers to which 
they outsource labour, taking advantage of ‘assembly work that has only ever had 
limited opportunities to upgrade economically or socially.’
161
  
 Therefore, preferential market access was beneficial to a limited degree in that it 
enabled developing countries to expand apparel industries and, as a result, employment. 
However, the type of employment was extremely limited and stifled both economic and 
social upgrading. A few countries, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, were able to 
leverage these advantages into backward linkages that allowed them to become major 
players in the apparel business.
162
 However, for most MFA and post-MFA apparel 
exporters, rules of origin requirements prevented them from establishing similar 
backward linkages.
163
 As a result, the benefits of industrialised apparel production have 
been limited to low-wage assembly employment.   
 In Jordan, the advantages of QIZ led to the creation of the apparel industry. Over 
90 per cent of the country’s apparel exports are destined for the US, and, because of 
limited labour supply, many of the newly created positions were staffed by a sudden 
influx of Chinese and South Asian workers.
164
 
 Morocco became a prime partner of the EU apparel industry due to its proximity 
and the subsequent advantages offered in terms of lead times and shipping costs. Due to 
OPT arrangements Morocco is now heavily dependent on EU markets. While OPT led 
to a consistent stream of orders, it also restricted the development of backward linkages 




II. APPAREL TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 
The 807 trade law passed in 1984 provided preferential access for countries that used 
US inputs in apparel exports. In 1986, the law was amended (known as the ‘Special 
Access Program’ and offered to CBI countries) to provide further benefits to countries 




 Ibid.  
163
 For example, apparel manufacturers in a CAFTA country would have been unable to create 
advantageous partnerships with cotton producers due to rules of origin that required use of US inputs. 
164
 Shame Al-Azmeh. ‘Working Conditions in Egypt’s and Jordan’s Garments Industry,’ Scoping Report 
for Capturing the Gains Project (2011). 
165





in the Americas by essentially removing quotas if countries exported apparel that was 
produced with fabrics both cut and formed in the US. The same benefits were extended 
to Mexico in 1988. These agreements were then replaced beginning in the 1990s, first 
with NAFTA in 1994, CAFTA in 2000 and CAFTA-DR in 2004. (The complexity of 
trade in the Americas is illustrated in Figure 1 below.) 
 NAFTA liberalised free trade among Canada, the US, and Mexico but preserved 
strict rules of origin that protected yarn and fabric companies within the signatory 
countries. This bolstered Mexico’s position as a prominent apparel exporter to the US 
and led to the swift rise of maquiladora production along the US Mexico border. 
 





 In the wake of NAFTA, Central American and Caribbean countries lobbied for 
trade parity in order to compete with Mexico, which eventually led to CAFTA-DR. The 
ramifications were highly uneven for various countries. Apparel exports increased in 
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Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, while the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica 
experienced declines. But even for those countries that successfully manoeuvred to 
improve market share under CAFTA-DR, export unit values were sacrificed, with the 
lone exception of Nicaragua. As we saw in the previous chapter, Nicaragua stood out as 
a singular success story in Central America and the Caribbean.
167
  
 Over 80 per cent of Nicaragua’s apparel exports received duty-free access to US 
markets.
168
 However, the majority of preferential access exports were not protected 
under CAFTA-DR provisions. Only 35 per cent of exports were exempted from tariffs 
by rules of origin under CAFTA, while 47 per cent were imported under TPLs that were 
granted to non-originating exports. Therefore, it is clear that the special access granted 
to Nicaragua has played an essential role in the success of their apparel industry. 
However, the TPLs, including the one-to-one rule that has benefitted Nicaragua, are set 
to expire in 2014, thus the country’s success is liable to suffer serious damages when 
those benefits are lost. I further discuss Nicaragua’s condition at the conclusion of this 
chapter. 
 
III. THE QUESTION OF ASIAN DOMINANCE 
The three most prominent types of upgrading in apparel value chains include increasing 
functional capabilities and backward linkages, export market diversification; and 
shifting from export markets to emerging domestic markets. 
 Increasing functional capabilities and establishing backward linkages is the most 
important upgrading strategy, and the most common avenue to accomplish this is the 
shift from assembly (CMT: cut, make, trim) to original equipment manufacturing 
(OEM).
169
 This shift often comes with the development of a domestic textile industry, 
which frees an industry from depending on foreign textiles that are controlled by tariffs 
and rules of origin. Most CAFTA countries remain restricted to CMT production, while 
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countries such as Vietnam, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Mexico have upgraded to OEM, 
although the textile base in Mexico is generally limited to US market demand.
170
 
 Successful upgrading to export market diversification is limited mostly to Asian 
exporters, while Latin American countries remain dependent on US markets. 
Diversification is crucial for continued growth of apparel exports as demand has slowed 
in end markets in the US and EU and picked up steam in the global South. 
 Apparel suppliers in China and India have successfully transitioned some 
production activities to target emerging domestic and regional markets.
171
 These 
markets present opportunities for functional upgrading into original brand 
manufacturing that target the strongest growth rates in the global apparel industry.
172
 
While China’s apparel industry has risen to dominance over the past two decades – not 
only capturing a huge swath of export market share but also producing for domestic and 
regional markets – Mexico’s industry has declined and is highly dependent on the US. 
China has diversified not only its end markets but also the products that it exports. 
 Why has China succeeded and Mexico failed? First, China began developing its 
apparel and textile industries around 1980 by investing in spinning technology, new 
looms, quality control, and logistics technology.
173
 While China continues to lead the 
way in apparel machinery investments, Mexico’s investments have remained stagnant. 
Secondly, China’s investments have resulted in their global reputation as the highest 
quality producer of apparel.
174
 Thirdly, while both countries have made efforts to keep 
workers’ wages down, China still offers cheaper labour, and overall costs have 
remained much lower in China due to high productivity.
175
 Fourthly, China has 
successfully achieved scale economies by creating ‘firm-specific clusters’ in which all 
supply chain sectors are based in one location – the Guangdong area – so as to reduce 
lead times and minimise transaction costs. Fifthly, China has benefitted from regionally 
integrated development. While the US used regional trade agreements to maintain 
domestic textile manufacturing and outsource labour to low-wage countries, Asian 
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countries benefitted from a more integrated model that enabled upgrading. US trade 
policy, on the other hand, fostered competition rather than integration among regional 
suppliers.
176
 Lastly, China’s domestic apparel market has grown much faster than 
Mexico’s, and Mexico has thus far failed to foster a local market for domestic brands.
177
 
 While Mexico and Central America maintain two advantages over Asian 
suppliers – proximity and preferential access – they have failed to transform this into a 
lasting advantage. As seen above, this is attributable to decisions made by the Mexican 
government, but is also due to regional arrangements designed by the US to protect 
their own industries. The larger point here is that these global inequalities in apparel 
trade suggest a great deal about the extent to which states retain control over these 
fragmented value chains.  
 Throughout this thesis I have mentioned Nicaragua as a singular success story in 
the Central America and Caribbean region. We now turn fully to the case of Nicaraguan 
apparel, an anomaly in Central America and the Caribbean, to illuminate important 
takeaways and further illustrate how much state policies control transnational trade.   
 
IV. LEARNING FROM NICARAGUA 
Nicaragua presents an interesting case to consider in light of developments throughout 
Central America and the Caribbean. As we have seen above, Nicaragua is one of the 
few countries that have achieved economic and social upgrading in the post-MFA world 
of apparel production, and it is the only country to do so in Central America and the 
Caribbean. Since 2005, the US has steadily imported less from the Americas and more 
from Asian markets, and China has become the world’s largest apparel exporter. Yet 
Nicaragua’s apparel industry has still prospered. Nicaragua’s share of the region’s 
apparel exports to the US rose from 8 percent in 2005 to 17 percent in 2011, this at a 
time when all other CAFTA countries except El Salvador experienced a decline. 
 Also, Nicaragua is the only Central America country to implement the Better 
Work programme (Haiti is the only other in the Americas), although – unlike many 
Better Work countries – Nicaragua has not experienced widespread abuses to begin 
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with. The 2007 election of Daniel Ortega, a Sindinista leader, has yielded positive 
trends in labour law enforcement, and Better Work is seen as a way to publicize their 
position as a ‘high road’ exporter rather than a way to improve working conditions in 
free trade zones (FTZs).
178
 The merits of Nicaragua’s approach must be considered with 
some qualifications, however. Turnover rates at Nicaraguan apparel factories are 
consistently high – one reported an annual turnover rate of 120 per cent.
179
 Bair and 
Gereffi reported that benefits like transportation to the work site and subsidized on-site 
lunch greatly reduced turnover,
180
 but if fringe benefits have such a strong effect, it 
seems unlikely that real social upgrading has occurred. At the same time, many 
managers regard high turnover as inevitable in the export business and therefore do not 
offer much formal training,
181
 and Nicaragua already offers the lowest labour costs of 
all the CAFTA countries.
182
 
 Nonetheless it is critical to consider why Nicaragua has enjoyed singular success 
in a region hit hard by the shift to Asian exporters. Nicaragua’s success is partly 
attributable to CAFTA-DR.
183
 A sampling of relevant regulations follows: 
 The rule of origin is yarn-forward, so preferential access is granted to all apparel 
sewn in a signatory country from inputs that derive from within the CAFTA 
region.  
 Additionally, de minimus allows inputs from outside the CAFTA region as long 
as the weight does not exceed 10 per cent of the entire garment.  
 Tariff preference levels (TPLs) are special provisions for Nicaragua, allowing 
their exports preferential access to US markets for apparel that does not satisfy 
CAFTAs rules of origin. More specifically, Nicaragua is allowed preferential 
access for non-originating garments up to 100 million square meters per year. 
TPLs were only granted for 10 years and are therefore set to expire in 2014.  
 The one to one rule is an additional stipulation for TPLs to ensure that the US 
benefits from the arrangement. The rule applies to pants that are imported under 
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Nicaragua’s TPL allowance, requiring that each shipment be matched by pants 
made from fabric that is woven in the US and extruded from the US. Any 
shortfall to this arrangement is then deducted against the allowed TPL for the 
following year.  
 The rule of cumulation allows apparel woven with fabric from Mexico and 
Canada to qualify as originating in the CAFTA region.  
 Finally, the commercial availability provision, or short supply, allows 
preferential access for garments that don’t meet rules of origin if the fabric 
cannot be acquired from the CAFTA region or is not available in a timely 
manner. 
 While the general benefits of CAFTA-DR are significant, these advantages 
alone are not sufficient to outcompete Asian markets. Otherwise, industries throughout 
Central America would be achieving similar success to Nicaragua. Rather, because 
Nicaragua is the least developed country of all those participating in CAFTA-DR, it was 
granted an additional advantage. Specifically, preferential treatment through TPLs 
allowed apparel exporters to skirt some restrictive rules of origin.
184
 TPLs are granted to 
Nicaragua for a specified amount of apparel, allowing preferential treatment for apparel 
that does not meet CAFTA’s rule of origin as long as it is sewn in Nicaragua. This 
means that Nicaragua is not compelled to use fabrics produced in the region, a 
significant advantage considering the dearth of cost-competitive fabrics locally 
available.
185
 In interviews conducted by Bair and Gereffi, all but one of the knit 
manufacturers depended on TPLs for at least some of their fabric.
186
  
 These TPLs will expire in December 2014 (while Haiti keeps theirs until 2018), 
which has caused great concern in a country highly dependent on trade for its 
development.
187
 This yields an interesting environment for the challenges of economic 
upgrading and social upgrading. Nicaragua has shown an interest in using apparel to 
generate both economic and social upgrading, but is restricted by CAFTA-DR 
regulations. Without extension of TPLs, economic gains may contract, making it 




 The ‘one-to-one’ rule was created to ensure the US benefitted from TPLs. For trousers shipped from 
Nicaragua to the US, half must be made from fabrics that are extruded and woven in the US. 
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difficult to sustain gains in social upgrading – wages, working conditions, and job 
security. 
 In interviews with Bair and Gereffi, many companies asserted that their future in 
Nicaragua depended on the renewal of TPLs,
188
 and some companies hinted at the 




 It is worth reiterating here that apparel production has a long history of being 
driven by trade policy, and it has been one of the most protected industries in global 
trade, including agricultural subsidies on cotton and wool, to quotas under the General 
Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) then under the WTO – first the MFA and then 
the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).
190
 
 Global trade liberalisation has been the dominant factor affecting the garment 
industry, but regional agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA-DR have bolstered the 
relationship between the US (the largest apparel market) and its trading partners. US 
apparel imports tripled between 1990 and 2005, fell from 2005 to 2009 due to the global 
recession, but surged again by 2011.
191
 China was the leading exporter to the US in 
1990, but the CAFTA-DR countries – as a collective – were close behind. By 2011, 
however, China nearly quadrupled the market share held by CAFTA-DR countries, 
while it held eight times that of Mexico’s share.
192
 Also, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and 
Cambodia collectively held two percent of market share in 1990, but that surged to 18 
percent in 2011. 
 But can these trade agreements lead to economic and social upgrading? Lead 
firms are increasingly turning to full-package production arrangements, in which a 
company is responsible for financing the purchase of raw materials, for production tasks 
beyond sewing such as screen printing and embroidery, and for pre-production jobs 
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such as creating patterns or designs. This suite of tasks far exceeds the typical 
maquiladora model seen in Latin America, and because of the resources and 
capabilities necessary it is seen as a form of economic upgrading.
193
  
 Apparel is vital to Nicaragua’s economic health. It is the country’s biggest 
manufacturing sector and accounted for over one-third of exports to the US in 2011.
194
 
In 2012, apparel factories made up 34 per cent of businesses in the FTZ, and garment 
firms accounted for 69,000 jobs – 67 percent of employment in the FTZ. Nearly two-
thirds of jobs in Nicaragua are informal, so these jobs are essential.
195
 
 While Nicaragua may not be able to out-compete Asian companies in terms of 
cost of production if the TPLs expire, the country does offer some advantages. Most 
notable is its potential to become a ‘high road’ exporter. Lead firms that fear the 
negative publicity associated with labour violations, or those that are fully committed to 
ethical sourcing, could potentially turn to Nicaragua due to its positive history of 
compliance with labour rights. The government recently passed the Tripartite 
Agreement, which could strengthen commitment to labour rights by fostering 
discussions among the industry’s stakeholders about how to ensure that workers benefit 
from growth.
196
 And the election of Ortega has brought with it notable improvements in 
labour law enforcement and employer practices. There are, however, justified concerns 
about workers’ rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining.
197
 
 Still, the Nicaraguan government has demonstrated strong support for the Better 
Work programme, and Gereffi and Bair were enthusiastic about its potential there: 
 ‘Specifically, Nicaragua offers a unique opportunity for working with industry 
 stakeholders, including foreign buyers, to develop an understanding of the factors 
 creating downward pressure on wages and working conditions in global supply chains, 
 and to search for ways to reduce these pressures. In this sense, Better Work has the 
 potential to go beyond the standard approach towards labour compliance, represented 
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 One of the most difficult labour violations to monitor and correct is freedom of 
association.
199
 This is partly because the interests of workers as represented in unions 
are perceived to be contrary to the goals of employers. Also, violating the right to 
freedom of association is not perceived to be as damaging to a company’s reputation as, 
for example, child labour or safety issues. Finally, freedom of association is difficult to 
monitor because it is an inherently dynamic process that is difficult to measure through 
objective data. 
 Despite these obstacles, Bair and Gereffi remain optimistic that Better Work can 
improve even labour rights that are not so easily standardized, largely because the 
Tripartite Commission has created a foundation of social dialogue on which to build.
200
 
They report that participation is high and the conversation is robust. There are, however, 
reasons to be sceptical. While factory managers can make important improvements in 
the lives of workers, it is also clear that buyers play an important role. Without their 
buy-in, factory managers are unable to remedy the vexations caused by short lead times 
and squeezed pricing. Local stakeholders such as government, trade unions and 
employers play a crucial role, but, due to power asymmetries, meaningful 
improvements will prove elusive without the participation of lead firms. 
 One interviewee expressed that ‘the brands have to understand that they need to 
be involved in this process. If it [Better Work] doesn’t generate contracts for 
companies, no one is going to participate because it won’t have any value added for 
them.’
201
 Thus far, meaningful brand participation has been scant. 
 
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
By now we have seen the great extent to which states have retained control over global 
trade and therefore have retained significant ability to affect social upgrading for 
workers in value chains. In the opening chapter I argued that, even in the context of 
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globalisation, democratic national institutions best protect citizen rights. The question of 
how to ensure that national institutions protect citizens' rights in a globalised world, 
however, presents a difficult problem. Thus far, the majority of efforts to protect 
workers in global value chains have focused on working within a private corporate 
governance model, but these efforts, though commendable, have largely failed. 
 But where do we turn next? I proposed that Fraser’s theory of justice is the best 
tool to frame the workers’ struggle. Using this theory, it is clear that NGOs must 
refocus their efforts on ensuring the participation of workers. This could mean using 
‘name and shame’ tactics to pressure corporations for process rights, but it also means 
that many more efforts should be focused on grassroots movements in the developing 
world. States have much more power within global value chains than GVC analysis 
initially claimed, and this is one arena in which workers already exercise some ‘parity 
of participation,’ simply because they are citizens of those countries. Of course, this is 
not a simple course. Labour ministries in developing countries are often underfunded 
and corrupt,
202
 but there is potential for NGOs to bolster state regimes rather than trying 
to work around them.
203
 
 Also, consumers still play an important role in the struggle for justice in global 
supply chains due to what Fraser calls the ‘all-affected principle.’
204
 Because consumers 
participate in the structure that creates injustice, they have a responsibility to continue to 
fight for the small improvements that have been achieved, by pressuring corporations 
and even to lobby governments to make corporations more liable for their behaviour. 
There is also great potential for citizens of developed countries to lobby for trade 
agreements that promote rather than hinder economic and social upgrading for 
developing trade partners. This is not the typical ‘aid for trade’ view of development, 
which argues for increased liberalisation, but rather it calls for a more closely 
considered understanding of how ‘free’ trade can impact developing economies in 
highly differentiated ways.  
                                                          
202
 Kevin Kolben, ‘Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of Governance,’ Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law 12:2 (2011), 77. 
203
 Ibid 79. 
204





 As previously discussed, there is an increasing awareness among governments 
that responsibility for social protections in global value chains should fall to states. The 
most prominent effort to hold states accountable for corporate abuses was undertaken 
by the United Nations Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other enterprises, which has also attempted to incorporate the role of 





































Transnational corporations domiciled in the Global North (and increasingly in the 
Global South, notably Brazil, India, and South Africa) conduct operations all over the 
world, creating difficulties as to who is capable of holding them to account when human 
rights violations occur. Due to the rise in social consciousness regarding the deleterious 
effects of transnational corporate activity, business and human rights issues became a 
permanent fixture on the global policy agenda in the 1990s.  
 The types and severity of human rights violations at stake vary greatly 
depending on industry and region. In a survey on the scope and patterns of abuse,
205
 a 
wide swath of human rights violations were identified using four core conventions: the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The 
survey revealed that both labour and non-labour rights were impacted, and the impacts 
were not discreet. For example, violations of child labour law affect right to education, 
the right to health and right to life. In South Africa, extractive industries discriminated 
against women in employment, thus many women resort to prostitution, thereby 
increasing community risk to HIV/AIDS infection. Freedom of association, right to 
equal pay, right to rest and leisure, right to self-determination, right to social security, 
right to a fair trial, and freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
were but a few of the rights impacted. Violations of the right to physical and mental 
health were common. 
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 Almost 60 per cent of violations involved direct company involvement; the 
other 40 per cent were indirect. 90 per cent of indirect cases involved a firm benefitting 
directly from state abuse of human rights. Indirect cases impacted workers more than 
communities (often because indirect cases are the result of complex global supply 
chains in the food, garment, and IT industries), while direct cases impacted 
communities more (due to extractive companies that often release toxic chemicals into 
surrounding environments
206
). Further, communities were directly impacted just as 
often as workers, contrary to the notion that workers suffer the majority of violations.
207
 
Lastly, some cases of abuse affected up to 60,000 people, and almost all cases involved 
more than 100 people.
208
   
 The United Nations initially responded to these crises with the Norms on 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, drafted by the then 
Commission on Human Rights, which attempted to impose on corporations the same 
human rights obligations as states under international law. This resulted in divisive 
contention between businesses and human rights groups and received little buy-in from 
states, and the Commission never acted on the Norms. Instead, in 2005 the Commission 
established a mandate for a Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue 
of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. John 
Ruggie was named the Special Representative, and he has received widespread praise 
for his tireless efforts over the following six years. 
 Because of the contentious history of business and human rights initiatives, the 
Special Representative was first charged with identifying and clarifying current 
practices, which he argued were too fragmented and incoherent to ever achieve scaled 
up results.
209
 He was then asked to submit recommendations, and he recommended 
adoption of his ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, a much more inclusive and 
holistic model than was proposed by the Norms on Transnational Corporations, which 
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targeted corporations only. Ruggie’s Framework proposed three pillars to address the 
issue: state duty to protect against third parties, corporate social responsibility, and 
access to remedy for victims of human rights abuse.  Eventually, he was tasked with 
operationalising the Framework, which resulted in the Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights. 
 To promote the effective implementation of the Guiding Principles, the Human 
Rights Council (HRC) established the Working Group on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other enterprises in March 2011.
210
 In this resolution, the 
HRC stressed that ‘the obligation and the primary responsibility to promote and protect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms lie with the State.’
211
 Here, the dramatic shift 
between the original Norms and the newly developed Guiding Principles is stark: from 
direct corporate responsibility for human rights to state obligation for protecting human 
rights abuses by corporations (although corporate social responsibility does remain a 
pillar of the Guiding Principles).  
 This background is important context for considering the merits and demerits of 
both the Guiding Principles and the Working Group’s efforts. Clearly, the work of the 
Special Representative was designed not to alienate corporate actors for fear of 
repeating the collapse suffered by the Norms, and this has serious consequences for the 
resulting Guiding Principles. Is shifting the primary responsibility for corporate human 
rights abuses to the state a positive development, or a step backward? Also, because the 
Norms imploded, Ruggie has stated that the two main achievements of the Principles 
are, first, an enhanced shared understanding of business and human rights challenges 
and, second, widespread engagement with the implementation of the Principles.
212
 He 
further argued that preserving these accomplishments should be the primary task of the 
Working Group. But is this approach too soft? Does this undermine the purpose of a 
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human rights document, which by its very nature must challenge power, especially in 
the context of business and human rights? 
 In this chapter I will address these concerns with a critique of both the Guiding 
Principles and the efforts of the Working Group thus far, which include the first annual 
Forum on Business and Human Rights and three country visits. I argue that shifting the 
primary responsibility for corporate human rights abuses to the state is a crucial step in 
the right direction. However, part of holding states responsible involves strongly 
challenging the pathways of power, both government and corporate, especially if we are 
to struggle for parity of participation for workers throughout value chains. 
 
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS 
In the late 1990s, the perceived ineffectiveness of states to regulate global corporations 
due to governance gaps led to the ‘mushrooming’ of corporate social responsibility and 
labour codes.
213
  Corporate codes are typically monitored by independent groups that 
utilise ‘name and shame’ strategies to encourage compliance.
214
 Although the Guiding 
Principles stepped back from placing exclusive obligations on corporations, corporate 
responsibility remains one of the three pillars, including the requirement for human 
rights impact assessments and sunset clauses. Guiding Principle 13 requires that 
businesses ‘should prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly 
linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if 
they have not contributed to those impacts.’
215
 The specificity of this article suggests 
that businesses cannot be excused from violations that occur far down the chain of a 
global value chain. Also of note, the Commentary under Guiding Principle 17 addresses 
the rampant practice of drafting exploitative agreements with developing countries, 
pointing out that violations often occur before a business begins operating. 
 These are promising developments. There is evidence that the implementation of 
these types of corporate codes has led to progress, especially in health and safety, but 
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also in reduction of working hours and an increase in wages for some workers (although 
not significant enough to guarantee a living wage).
216
 Yet many have begun to question 
whether corporate codes are truly effective in protecting basic labour standards, 




 Also, while limited improvements have been documented for specific conditions 
of work such as health and safety, negligible improvements have been seen in ‘process 
rights,’ or the ability of workers to negotiate on their own behalf via freedom of 
association and the right to collective bargaining.
218
  
 The failure of private enterprises to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights on 
their own should not be surprising. Businesses are designed to maximize profits. This 
sentiment is strongly reflected in the Working Group’s statement at the conclusion of its 
visit to the United States: 
 ‘There was suspicion and even outright rejection of important elements of the human 
 rights framework, particularly as it relates to labour rights, and the content of individual 
 rights. This raises the concerns about the likely extent of implementations of the 
 corporate responsibility to respect all internationally recognised human rights, 
 particularly in locales or industries where regulation and protection of rights is 
 lacking… It was of some concern to note that the ‘realities’ of national laws and 
 cultural contexts generally prevail over human rights criteria when evaluating whether 
 to do business in certain places.’
219
 
 Thus, while continued efforts in the realm of corporate responsibility are a 
worthwhile endeavour and the improvements experienced are not insignificant, the 
evidence suggests that they must be strongly buttressed by other safeguards, which 
leads us to another pillar of the Guiding Principles: the state duty to protect human 
rights. States are more capable structures for guaranteeing human rights because, while 
corporations are responsible to shareholders for profit margins, states hold the highest 
responsibility to citizens (though clearly states are also influenced in significant ways 
by corporate powers). Of course, states are the traditional protectors of rights, and 
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corporate codes are a response to the perceived powerlessness of states to regulate 
business activity across borders. The next section explores state responsibility in 
international law regarding private enterprises, how states may actually harness more 
power than is commonly assumed, and whether the Guiding Principles reflect this 
adequately. 
 
III. THE STATE DUTY TO PROTECT 
Do states have a duty to protect from human rights abuses by private enterprises? 
Special Representative Ruggie argued that there is clearly emerging customary law in 
this regard, based on the fact that ‘more recently-adopted treaties explicitly mention 
private businesses in this respect.’
220
 Also, references to business violations are 
included in the Concluding Observations (increasingly over the last 10 years) from the 
Committees for the following treaties: ICCPR, ICESCR, ICERD, CEDAW, CRC, 
OPSC, ICRMW, and CAT.
221
  
 The HRC has stated the necessity for states to act with ‘due diligence’,
222
 which 
can be generally understood in the context of Velazquez Rodriguez, which holds states 
responsible for private violations if it did not act to prevent them or respond 
appropriately.
223
 In August of 2013, the Secretary General stated this clearly: ‘The duty 
to protect implies that States must take measures to prevent or end infringement upon 
the enjoyment of a given human right caused by third parties.’
224
 
 In General Comment 18, ‘The Right to Work,’ the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) stated that states have the duty to protect and that 
human rights obligations could be violated if states fail to ‘regulate the activities of 
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 A significant obstacle in state responsibility to prevent corporate abuse is 
extraterritoriality, wherein states may not have the power to prosecute private 
enterprises that are either domiciled or conducting activities outside of their traditional 
jurisdiction. Regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction, most treaty bodies do not require 
states to act on businesses abroad, but Ruggie concluded that there is an emerging 
pattern of treaties recommending they influence businesses where possible. Also, there 




 Though lacking specificity regarding legal powers, other UN documentation 
bolsters the notion that states have at least some extraterritorial powers. For example, in 
General Comment 14, the CESCR addresses the potential widespread violations to 
health, as seen in examples of actions by extractive companies mentioned above:  
 ‘State parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and 
 to prevent third parties from violating the right in other countries, if they are able to 
 influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in accordance with the 
 Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.’
227
  
 In addition, it is suggested that states have strong extraterritorial obligations 
regarding investment agreements. The CESCR ‘Right to Work’ document says that 
states can violate the duty to protect if they don’t consider Covenant obligations ‘when 
entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements with other States, international 
organizations and other entities such as multinational entities.’
228
 Again, the Secretary 
General recently bolstered this argument by claiming that, while investment treaties can 
strengthen economic growth, there is also the danger that ‘they can weaken States’ 
abilities to regulate domestically, and as a consequence, restrict the ability of States to 
implement international human rights obligations, or to adhere to new obligations or 
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 This provides substantial support for the notion that states are 
responsible for human rights throughout global value chains, and this could apply to 
both the home and host countries of corporations. 
 Thus, while the development of corporate social responsibility is seen as a 
response to the state’s lack of power within the current globalised economic regime, 
there is also the clearly resurgent notion that states have retained the power to regulate 
private enterprises. This is itself a commendable achievement by the Special 
Representative and is reflected strongly in the Guiding Principles. 
 In light of this, Guiding Principle 9 is one of the most crucial components of this 
human rights document, which requires states to ‘maintain adequate domestic policy 
space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-related policy 
objectives with other States or business enterprises, for instance through investment 
treaties or contracts.’
230
 This single item, however, denotes some of the greatest 
strengths and weaknesses of the Guiding Principles. 
 First, an obvious weakness of Principle 9 is the ‘soft’ language, which does not 
explicitly hold states accountable for human rights obligations in investment treaties but 
instead requires that they ‘maintain adequate domestic policy space’ to do so. In fact, it 
does not even require that human rights language be instilled in the agreements, only 
that adequate policy space remains viable. 
 Secondly, Principle 9, and the Guiding Principles in general, make no attempts 
to challenge the conventional economic wisdom inherent in investment treaties, 
particularly the emphasis on trade liberalisation as propagated by the WTO. There is no 
consideration that these agreements may themselves be in violation of human rights 
standards. For example, Stiglitz argues that two major tenets of the WTO platform 
hinder the right to development because developing countries are now playing by 
different rules than those utilised by the current economic superpowers to achieve their 
status.
231
 When the superpowers’ markets were emerging, there was no strict protection 
of intellectual property (as seen in the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
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Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS), and they liberally ‘borrowed’ ideas and 
technology in order to advance their own economies. Now that developed countries 
have a monopoly on intellectual property, developing countries are not allowed the 
same freedom. Also, the current superpowers imposed high tariffs while their 
economies were still emerging in order to protect domestic industries, but, again, 
current developing countries are not allowed the same protection in the name of free 
trade. In addition to potentially violating the right to development, this also impacts the 
right to an adequate standard of living (Arts. 11 and 12 of the ICESCR) and the right to 
self-determination (Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR). 
 Thirdly, Guiding Principle 9 does not address the power imbalances in trade 
agreements that inhibit many countries in the Global South from maintaining ‘adequate 
domestic policy space.’ In the previous chapter, I explored the great extent to which 
these trade agreements can limit protections of rights for workers in developing 
economies. In a response to a draft of the Guiding Principles made available for 
comment, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights noted exactly this 
problem:  
 ‘We propose that the power relations between states should be explicitly stated. 
 Developing countries that are negotiating bilateral trade and/or investment agreements 
 may not be in a position to retain their domestic policy space due to power imbalances 
 and development aid conditionalities.’
232
 
 This is a crucial point to consider if we are going to prevent corporate abuse in 
GVCs. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, powerful states exercise strong 
influence on the livelihoods of workers in developing countries by way of trade 
regulations negotiated in their favour. If we are to see any improvements for workers, 
governments in both developed and developing nations must both be held accountable 
to protect the vulnerable labourers in GVCs.   
 Of course, here we arrive at the core tension in the Guiding Principles, which is 
the fine line between not alienating powerful actors from participating in the process 
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while still achieving progress for human rights. Ruggie clearly believes that striking a 
balance between maintaining inclusivity and challenging power is key to the Working 
Group’s success. While an open process was essential for developing the Guiding 
Principles, this also leaves the Principles open to manipulation to the point that it 
becomes too soft to impact any real change. It is clear that the Special Representative 
erred on the side of inclusivity, at least in this instance, because he ignored the concerns 
of the Kenya National Commission – and the wealth of data already presented in this 
dissertation – and kept the Principle as is. Principle 10 does hint at some of these power 
imbalances in trade agreements, albeit in an equally soft manner. 
 This has exposed the Guiding Principles to strong criticisms. Ruggie responded 
to some of these criticisms in an open letter:  
 ‘So let [Amnesty International] and HRW hold out the promise to victims that 
 something good may come their way in another generation. My aim, as I have stated 
 explicitly from the beginning, is to reduce corporate-related human rights harm to the 
 maximum extent possible in the shortest possible period of time.’
233
 
 This response points to several potential advantages to this softer, more 
inclusive approach. While this strategy is never going to topple the power imbalances 
inherent in, for example, the WTO, there is the possibility that open dialogue can still 
greatly enhance the opportunities to implement more robust human rights mechanisms.  
 For example, if multilateral trade agreements can open borders for private 
enterprises to crisscross with ease, might this dialogue carve a path for reaching an 
agreement on multilateral cooperation that would hold private human rights abusers 
accountable across borders? Indeed, the blatant imbalances between the robust 
liberalised trade structure versus the complete lack of accountability suggests that the 
dearth of state power may be largely a problem of political will, and the efforts of the 
Working Group in implementing the Guiding Principles may harness the potential to 
build momentum for such will. 
 The Working Group has clearly stated what they perceive as the primary 
obstacle to achieving respect for human rights throughout business operations: 
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‘Governance gaps lie at the core of the human rights and business challenge.’
234
 As 
such, the Working Group must consider its primary task the building of bridges across 
governance gaps. This cannot be accomplished if all the actors involved are not in the 
room. However, if the actors are in the room, certain realities can be accounted for. 
 Also, it is significant that, while the Working Group uses the narrative of 
governance gaps – which I have contested – it urges states to bridge such governance 
gaps. This implies what I posited in the opening chapter: states are able to act but have 
thus far been unwilling.   
 A survey by the Special Representative revealed that the majority of states focus 
on corporate social responsibility, rather than on human rights specifically, and states 
rarely include human rights language in bilateral investments treaties and free trade 
agreements (the EU being a notable exception).
235
 Yet it is well known that countries in 
the Global North have long promoted neo-liberal policies that erode such redistributive 
mechanisms as labour law via foreign policy, trade legislation and treaties, and 
exercising power in international economic institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and 
WTO.
236
 Also, although issues of extraterritoriality are complex, the United States 
actually has passed legislation that shelters corporate actors from the harmful effects of 
business decisions overseas, rather than pushing for access to remedy for victims.
237
 
Further, other governance bridges could be included in multilateral treaties and regional 
trade agreements, such as requiring labour representation from host states on executive 
boards that operate in home states.
238
  
 All of these point to the fact that states can and must be more engaged in 
addressing governance gaps, and the Guiding Principles provide a promising platform 
for this to occur.  Guiding Principle 2 states that home states ‘should set out clearly the 
expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction 
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respect human rights throughout their operations.’
239
 Again, the language is soft, but it 
demands the beginnings of an important dialogue.  
 It is also important to point out that, even when accounting for power 
imbalances, developing countries have been complicit in allowing many violations to 
occur in their own territories. Governments have ‘actively eroded labour rights’ to 
attract foreign investment and created zones of impunity that are ripe for abuse.
240
 In 
addition, in the wake of the global economic crisis, the power dynamics between the 
Global North and Global South are rapidly shifting, largely due to the increasing 
prominence of the BRICS countries. This shift holds great promise for enabling states to 
reassert power over private enterprises that are domiciled elsewhere. Thus, Guiding 
Principle 1, which demands that states are responsible for violations by private 
enterprises, forces dialogue on how best to fulfil this obligation. 
 
IV. ACCESS TO REMEDY 
The third pillar of the Guiding Principles deals with access to remedy and promotes the 
importance of state-based and non-state-based judicial mechanisms. This pillar receives 
the least attention in the Guiding Principles, and I will spend little time discussing it 
here, though not because I deny its significance. Indeed, access to remedy is at least as 
important as the other two pillars, if not more important, because this is the one 
mechanism that actually gives power to those whose rights are violated and promotes 
parity of participation, if implemented appropriately. However, I grant it little space 
here because the problems inherent in this pillar of the Guiding Principles intersect 
strongly with issues presented above, which I need not repeat in detail.  
 In general, the Principles for access to remedy offer an interesting platform on 
which to discuss problematic issues, but I do not believe they go far enough. For 
example, regarding state-based judicial mechanisms, Principle 25 asserts that states 
have a duty to ensure that victims of abuse within their territory have access to remedy. 
Because corporations have so much power across the world, in both North and South, 
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access to remedy is often blocked, even when states have the necessary jurisdictional 
reach. However, the Guiding Principles make no effort to promote state-based remedy 
across jurisdictions, which ignores what the Working Group declared as the most 




 In the final section of this chapter, I discuss the Working Group’s actual efforts 
thus far, which consist of the first annual Forum on Business and Human Rights and 
three country visits, to Mongolia, the US, and Ghana. In his final report to the HRC, 
Special Representative Ruggie spelled out the overall thrust of his work and looked to 
the future:  
 ‘What do these Guiding Principles do? And how should they be read? Council 
 endorsement of  the Guiding Principles, by itself, will not bring business and human 
 rights challenges to an end. But it will mark the end of the beginning: by establishing a 
 common global platform for action, on which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-
 step, without foreclosing any other promising longer-term developments.’
242
 
 If the Guiding Principles are the ‘end of the beginning’, then the efforts of the 
Working Group entail the difficult task of moving the Principles into action. I critique 
the Group’s progress based on the rubric they have set for themselves: Can they 
challenge the powers necessary to address the governance gaps that enable continued 
impunity for abuses, and at the same time maintain widespread buy-in for the 
Principles? 
 
V. IS THE WORKING GROUP WORKING? 
In December 2012, at the first annual Forum on Business and Human Rights, 50 
governments, 150 businesses, 170 civil society organizations, 5 international trade 
union networks, and 20 national human rights groups met to discuss the promotion and 
implementation of the Guiding Principles.
243
 This kind of forum, with this level of 
participants, is itself commendable for the reasons discussed above: it encourages 
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dialogue about the complex issue of businesses and human rights and brings greater 
clout to the issue. 
 In the opening remarks, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Navanethem Pillay, ‘called on Governments to step up to close the governance gaps that 
had played a large part in both facilitating and sustaining the current economic crisis’,
244
 
thereby reinforcing what I have argued is a strength of the Guiding Principles: 
emphasising that state structures provide the most promising avenue for progress. 
 In addition, the Forum allowed for civil society organizations to speak to 
structural power issues. Terra de Direitos asserted that companies hire third parties to 
externalize risks and avoid liability for human rights violations,
245
 and Amnesty 
International argued that judicial remedy is restricted by foreign investors that shape 
regulation.
246
 The International Trade Union Confederation argued that business 
violations in Africa are largely due to the fact that ‘businesses pressure politicians to 
restrict labour rights and implement business-friendly laws.’
247
 Victims of abuse by 
extractive companies operating in Peru and the Democratic Republic of Congo were 
able to bring light to specific violations.
248
 Again, this points to one of the strengths of 
the Guiding Principles soft approach, which allows NGOs and victims the rare chance 
to address powerful players when they are a captive audience.  
 Of course, criticism can and should be levelled. Dialogue does not necessarily 
lead to concrete change. At the Forum, several civil society organizations, such as the 
Africa Centre for Corporate Responsibility, noted that action rather than talk was 
needed going forward.
249
 Yet it should not be denied that bringing these actors together 
in one room can potentially build momentum for significant change, even if that 
progress is slow. The Forum, while not revolutionising the arena of business and human 
rights, seemed to perform somewhat as intended. Structural power issues were 
challenged and debated, yet the process remained inclusive enough so as not to alienate 
those powers. 
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 The Working Group’s country visits are more difficult to judge at this point. 
They only received funding to conduct two country visits per year, which is not 
sufficient to investigate the activities of a single large corporation, and it may be too 
early to arrive at such sweeping conclusions. However, the documents produced from 
the three country visits thus far indicate the unwillingness (or inability) to assess 
structural issues that must be addressed in order for true reform to occur (although the 
full country visit reports are not yet available for the US and Ghana). While there is 
clear evidence that states can do much to improve working conditions domestically, it is 
also imperative to keep in mind that many corporate abuses are the result of power 
imbalances between states. 
 In its report on the visit to Mongolia, the Working Group noted:  
 ‘The key challenge for any country, especially one that is undergoing rapid economic 
 development like Mongolia, is to maximize the positive effects of business (e.g. 
 economic development, building infrastructure, employment) while minimizing the 
 negative impacts (e.g. damage to the environment, violation of labour rights, reduced 
 access to public services).’
250
  
 What the report did not mention is that these ill effects are typically the result of 
investment by foreign companies that are difficult to hold accountable due to power 
imbalances and problems of extraterritoriality. The issue of governance gaps was not 
specifically addressed, nor was the lopsided leverage between wealthy corporate actors 
and the government officials striving for economic growth. Again, when dealing with 
human rights violations by transnational corporations, it is essential for both the 
developed and developing states to play a role.  
 The report notes many of the negative impacts on workers employed by mining 
operations, specifically impacts on health, family life, and ability to participate in the 
political process as workers do not get time off to vote in elections.
251
 This of course 
leaves room for rampant corruption as it gives mine operators great political power. It is 
promising that government remedies were promised to the visiting expert,
252
 but the 
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report fails to point out that government remedies are unlikely to occur as long as 
mining companies maintain such strong political clout.  
 On the other hand, the report was successful in pointing out some harmful 
practices that could be addressed under the immediate scope of Mongolian jurisdiction. 
Mongolian legislation requires seeking the opinions of local residents before issuing 
mineral licenses, but this is rarely done in practice. One group of nomadic herders 
lamented that they discovered a mining operation was coming to their area only after 
the machinery had arrived, and many herders have lost access to their traditional 
lands.
253
 This is an issue with a rather simple remedy, and time will only tell if the 
country visit impacts implementation of such a remedy. There exists the possibility for 
citizens to be empowered through the country visit and begin to pressure the 
government for important changes.  
 Although the full report of the visit to the US is not yet available, the statement 
at the end of the visit offers some indication that governance gaps will be addressed, if 
only briefly. The statement concludes: ‘Significant gaps appear to remain in regulation, 
oversight and enforcement in areas where business activities may adversely impact 
human rights.’
254
 The statement also reminded the US government that they are not 
prohibited from preventing or addressing rights violations by companies domiciled in 
their jurisdiction – an encouraging sign, indeed. However, the statement fails to note 
that US legislation actually protects corporate actors, and that they participate in 
numerous multilateral agreements that dismantle some labour rights. 
 In its statement at the end of the country visit to Ghana, the Working Group 
specifically addresses Guiding Principle 9, discussed at length above, regarding the 
state’s obligation to maintain policy space to enforce human rights obligations. 
‘Bilateral trade and investment treaties should not constrain the Government of Ghana’s 
policy space for evolving the regulatory framework to protect rights, or for ensuring the 
progressive realization of economic and social rights.’
255
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 This assertion from the Working Group is an appropriate statement on which to 
close this chapter, because it indicates the difficulties explored throughout the thesis. 
While it is important to note the significant human rights consequences of trade and 
investment treaties, these discussions are only beneficial if they ultimately reveal the 
power structures that are subverting the ability to protect human rights. As noted above, 
in many cases Ghana may be unable to maintain policy space due to power imbalances 
in these agreements. If Ghana’s trade partners are listening, this may create a path for 





























A clear arch has emerged across this dissertation. In the introduction and opening 
chapter, I argued that, while most posit that states have lost the ability to regulate global 
trade, it is crucial for states to reclaim their power to bridge governance gaps. In the 
second and third chapters, I presented a detailed argument for just how much power 
states wield in affecting the lives of workers in GVCs. In the final chapter, I discussed a 
promising turn in the UN, which is now prioritising state accountability for human 
rights violations by corporate actors. This latest movement reflects much faltering thus 
far, but I reaffirm that it is a promising development.   
 Of course, there are no simple solutions to a dilemma that seems to constantly 
grow more complex and, in turn, more vexing. However, any momentum towards 
prioritising state responsibility is important to sustain. At the same time, I do not 
suggest terminating efforts that utilise private governance. These efforts have made 
some crucial progress, and, just as importantly, they have already built a grassroots 
foundation that could be used to lobby states – both developed and developing – to seek 
remedies.  
 In truth, it is most likely that a hybrid form of public-private governance is our 
best bet. The problem is substantial enough that uncommon alliances must be forged. It 
is clearly not sufficient to simply boycott those brands that mistreat their labourers. 
Much like the corporations that penetrate so many state boundaries, communities must 
also be united across oceans and continents to struggle together on whichever 
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